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INTRODUCTION

Among the more controversial provisions of the Hostage Agreement,' through which the United States and Iran 2 agreed to the

terms for the release of the 52 Americans held captive in Iran for 444
days, were President Carter's commitment to nullify all attachments
1. The Hostage Agreement as completed in Algiers on January 19, 1981, is recorded
in five documents: A Declaration of the Government of Algeria describing the Agreement [hereinafter cited as Declaration]; a procedural document, entitled "Undertakings
of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria," that describes the disposition of various Iranian assets
through an escrow fund [hereinafter cited as Undertakings]; a second declaration of the
Algerian Government, entitled "Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,"
describing the claims settlement procedure [hereinafter cited as Claims Settlement Declaration]; the Escrow Agreement, which provides for the management of the escrow fund;
and, the Technical Agreement, which describes the duties of the depository bank. (The
Bank of England later agreed to serve as escrow depositary.)
The Department of State publicly released copies of the first and second documents,
(1) the general declaration of the Algerian Government and, (2) the declaration concerning the claims settlement process. The New York Times reprinted these two documents.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at A4, col. 1. These two documents, together with the Undertakings, supra, of the government of the United States and the government of Iran are
reprinted in the transcript of the hearing held on February 19, 1981, before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Iranian Asset Settlement: Hearing
Before the Senate Comnr on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
30-41 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Senate Banking Hearing]. All five documents are
included in the record of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Iran Agreements:
Hearings Before the Senate Com'm on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 230-42
(1981). [hereinafter cited as Senate Foreign Relations Hearings].
President Carter issued a series of Executive orders shortly before he left office implementing the provisions of the Hostage Agreement. Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-84, 46 Fed.
Reg. 7913-30 (1981). In issuing these Executive orders, President Carter relied in part on
authority vested in him by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1706 (Supp. II 1978) (IEEPA). Section 204(b) of the IEEPA, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1703(b), requires the President to report to the Congress immediately upon the exercise
of his authority under the Act. See AcTION WITH RESPECT TO IRAN: MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 15, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

On the Hostage Agreement and the litigation it has spawned, see generally Symposium on
the Settlement with Iran, 13 LAw. AM. 1 (1981); Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement
Under International and United States Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 822 (1981).
2. In November 1980, the Iranian officials primarily responsible for dealing with all
aspects of the hostage affair designated the Algerian government as the sole contact for
communications between Iran and the United States on the hostage issue. Iran's Seizure
ofthe United States Embassy: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1981) (prepared statement of Harold H. Saunders, Former Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs) [hereinafter cited as House
Foreign Affairs Hearings].
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of Iranian assets in the United States, to terminate all litigation
pending against Iran in United States courts, and to refer those
3
claims to a specially created international arbitral tribunal. Commercial claimants, both individual and corporate, immediately challenged the provisions of the Hostage Agreement that jeopardized
their claims against Iran.4 The claimants asserted that the Hostage
Agreement raised "serious constitutional and other legal questions." 5
3. See infra notes 25-48 and accompanying text.
4. See e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1981, at All, col. 1; id, Jan. 23, 1981, at AS, col. 3;
Id, at A17, col. 1. One company, the Electronic Data Systems Corporation Iran (EDS),
asserts that it is the only claimant that had both validly attached Iranian assets in this
country and had actually secured a $19 million judgment against Iran before President
Carter froze the Iranian assets on November 14, 1979. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. Soon after the Hostage Agreement took effect, EDS sought an injunction
in a federal district court in Texas to ensure that the government would not interfere with
its judgment or attachment. See also infra note 5. Pursuing all options, EDS also sued
the United States government to ensure that it would receive money from the escrow
account called for in the Agreement. Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 2, col. 3.
Not all claimants rushed immediately into court to challenge the Agreement. Thirtyseven law firms representing clients with claims of nearly $1.3 billion formed a steering
committee to coordinate their clients' efforts to protect their claims against Iran. Lawrence W. Newman, of Baker & McKenzie, chaired the committee. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19,
1981, at D2, col. 3.
5. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1981, at 5, col. 1. The claimants argued that the President's
actions unconstitutionally invaded the provinces of the judiciary and the Congress; that
the statutes upon which President Carter relied did not authorize the actions he took to
free the hostages; and, that even if the cited statutes properly authorized the President's
actions, the Hostage Agreement resulted in a public "taking" under the fifth amendment,
for which the claimants deserved to receive just compensation. These arguments are
analyzed infra at notes 230-74 and accompanying text.
In addition to these constitutional and statutory challenges, the circumstances surrounding the resolution of the crisis suggest two other challenges to the validity of the
Hostage Agreement. A claimant advanced one of the arguments in support of its application for a preliminary injunction to bar the United States government from taking any
action that would interfere with its ability to execute on a $19 million judgment against
the Social Security Organization of Iran. EDS argued that President Carter did not
legally promulgate the Executive orders that implemented the Hostage Agreement. EDS
noted that President Carter signed the Orders on January 19, 1981, while he was still in
office, but that the Orders were not filed for publication with the Federal Register until
January 23, 1981, three days after he left office. A document required to be published in
the Federal Register is not valid until it has been filed with the Office of the Federal
Register and copies are made publicly available. 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1976). Brief of Plaintiff Electronic Data Systems Corporation Iran in Support of Application for Preliminary
Injunction In Aid of Judgment at 20-22, Elec. Data. Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of
the Gov't of iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
The district court granted plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. In response to
this particular argument the court noted that the plaintiff raised "a unique and novel
question of law" and concluded that there was "a substantial likelihood that the Executive Order[s] [were] not validly promulgated during President Carter's term of office."
Elec. Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of the Gov't of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350,
1359 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (order granting preliminary injunction).
On February 24, 1981 President Reagan ratified the Executive orders that President
Carter had signed on January 19, 1981. Exec. Order No. 13,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111
(1981). He took this action "to remove any doubt as to their effect, an issue that has been
raised in recent litigation challenging them."SuSPENSION OF CERTAIN LITIGATION
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In the storm of litigation that occurred soon after the release of
the hostages, the federal district and circuit courts were reaching
conflicting decisions regarding the validity and enforceability of the
Hostage Agreement. 6 A definitive ruling on the validity of the
Agreement was necessary, because Iran could have considered the
United States to be in breach of the Agreement if all of the attached
Iranian assets were not transferred out of the United States by July
19, 1981. 7 Responding to the exigencies of the situation, the
H.R. Doc.
No. 25, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1981).
The circumstances surrounding the resolution of the crisis also suggest a second challenge to the Hostage Agreement. Arguably, the Agreement is void because it was
obtained through the illegal use of force and duress, in violation of Article 52 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
openedforsignqture May 22, 1969, 1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 (Cmd. 7964) (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980), reprintedin 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). This issue was the subject of debate
in a series of articles that appeared in the National Law Journal. See Malawar, A Gross
Violation of Treaty Law, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 2, 1981, at 13, col. 1; Gordon, Ratfication with
Reservations, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 20, 1981, at 13, col. 1; Malawar, Renunciation, With Rigor,
id, at 13, col. 2. See also Correspondence, Void Ab Initio: The U.S.-Iran Hostage
Accords, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 347 (1981). But see N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1981, at A8, col. 3,
wherein it is reported that Andreas F. Lowenfeld, professor of international law at New
York University, and other legal experts do not agree with the suggestion that the Hostage Agreement might be invalid due to duress and extortion. Warren M. Christopher,
Former Deputy Secretary of State and head of the United States negotiating team in
Iran, believes that because the Agreement as a whole is in the best interests of the United
States, this country should not raise the issue of the validity and enforceability of the
Agreement under the provisions of the Vienna Convention. See Senate ForeignRelations
Hearings,supra note 1, at 39 (statement of Warren M. Christopher, Former Deputy Secretary of State).
6. Courts upholding the Agreement included: Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan
Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (Ist Cir. 1981); Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Gov't of Iran,
513 F. Supp. 864 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (President had the authority to declare all attachments
of Iranian property null and void); Unidyne Corp. v. Gov't of Iran, 512 F. Supp. 705
(E.D. Va. 1981); Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Org. of Iran, No. 79-04918 LEW
(Px) (C.D. Cal. 1981) (denied the claimant's motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the Executive orders implementing the Hostage Agreement).
AGAINST IRAN: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

Courts taking the view that at least some aspect of the Hostage Agreement was objectionable included: Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (the court denied the government's motion to vacate the attachments on the Iranian assets); Elec. Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social See. Org. of the Gov't of Iran, 508 F.
Supp. 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (enjoined the government from removing the assets being

secured with an attachment).
7. The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria required the United States to transfer to a designated central bank all Iranian
deposits and securities in U.S. branches of U.S. Banks within six months of the date of
the Hostage Agreement. Declaration, supra note 1, Points II and III, para. 6.
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee former Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher contended
that a total or partial repudiation of the Hostage Agreement would constitute a breach of
faith with Algeria, Great Britain, West Germany, and Switzerland--countries that
helped the United States and Iran conclude the accords. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1981, at
A4, col. 3. Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 1, at 33 (statement of Warren
M. Christopher, Former Deputy Secretary of State). House Foreign Affairs Hearings,
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Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment in Dames &
Moore v. Regan8 and set an expedited briefing and argument schedule. Eight days after oral argument the Court rejected several statutory and constitutional challenges and held that the President had
the authority to enter into the Hostage Agreement. 9 This decision
cleared the way for the timely release of the attached assets. 10
This Note examines the Hostage Agreement and the Court's
opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan.' 2 In particular, this Note analyzes the President's statutory' 3 and constitutional 4 authority to terminate the domestic litigation involving Iran. This analysis suggests
that although the Court's conclusion in Dames & Moore v. Regan is
correct, the Court's opinion should have rested on other grounds.
This Note also discusses the possible outcome of future litigation
that may be brought by claimants who are dissatisfied with the outcome of their proceeding before the Arbitral Tribunal.' 5
I. THE HOSTAGE AGREEMENT
A.

THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO THE HOSTAGE TAKING

In response to the captivity of American diplomatic personnel
in Iran, President Carter declared a national emergency' 6 and
blocked the removal or transfer of "all property and interests in
property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become
supra note 2, at 144 (statement of Warren M. Christopher, Former Deputy Secretary of

State).
8. Dames & Moore v. Regan, cert.granted, 101 S. Ct. 3071 (1981). See infra notes
57-77 and accompanying text. See generally Tell, Iran Assets Case FinallyMakes It to
High Court, Nat'l L.J., June 22, 1981, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 12, 1981, at D1 col. 6.
9. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
10. See infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 16-56 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 78-151 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 152-273 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 230-74 and accompanying text.
16. As authority for his actions, the President cited the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1701-1706 (Supp. 11 1978), which provides, in
part, that the President may exercise his authority under the Act "to deal with any unusual or extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or in substantial part outside
the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat." 50
U.S.C. § 1701(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
This was the first time that a President invoked the IEEPA. Senate Banking Hearing,
supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Sen. John Heinz). For further discussion of the IEEPA
and the President's reliance upon it for authority in concluding the Hostage Agreement,
see infra notes 103-34 and accompanying text.
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subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."' 7 The Treasury
Department, acting pursuant to presidential authorization, issued
detailed regulations implementing the provisions of the Executive
order. 18
The regulations authorized judicial proceedings, including prejudgment attachments, with respect to blocked property in which
Iran or an Iranian entity had an interest.' 9 But the regulations
explicitly did not authorize or license the entry of any judgment, the
payment out of a blocked account based upon a judicial proceeding,
or the enforcement of any judgment or decree with regard to any
blocked property.20 The regulations did not invalidate pre-judgment
attachments legally obtained before November 14, 1979, but the regulation did establish procedures for the licensing of pre-judgment
attachments obtained after that date. 21 In addition, the regulations
clearly provided that the post-freeze licenses could be amended,
22
modified, or revoked at any time.
Before the release of the American hostages, United States
nationals, both individuals and corporations, took advantage of all
available procedures to protect their rights against the Government
of Iran. More than three hundred nonbank companies with claims
totaling more than $3 billion filed lawsuits against Iran, and claimants registered over two thousand other claims with the Treasury
Department.23 The claimants in these lawsuits included oil compa17. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980). See also 15 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 2117-18 (Nov. 15, 1979).
18. The regulations provided, in part, that:
No property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which is in the
possession of or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
in which on or after the effective date [November 14, 1979] Iran has any interest
of any nature whatsoever may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or
otherwise dealt in except as authorized.
31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1980). In the days and weeks immediately following the President's
declaration of the Iranian asset freeze, the Treasury Department frequently amended,
revised, and sometimes revoked the pertinent regulations as the Executive Branch struggled to understand and implement this previously untested foreign policy weapon. The
regulations appearing at 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.101-.904 (1980) reflect all changes as of June
30, 1980. The volume of the Code of Federal Regulations revised as of July 1, 1981
includes the Treasury Department Regulations that implement the Hostage Agreement.
31 C.F.R. §§ 535.101-.904 (1981). This Note will frequently cite to the 1980 version of
the regulations. Though already superseded at the time of this writing, the 1980 regulations were controlling during most of the crisis period.
19. Id §§ 535A18, .504.
20. Id §§ 535.504(b)(l)-(2), .418.
21. Id § 535.801. A general license authorized the pre-judgment attachments and
other judicial proceedings.
22. Id § 535.805.
23. N.Y. Times, Jan..22, 1981, at Al1, col. 1. Supplementing his testimony before the
Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, a former Deputy Secretary of
the Treasury submitted a report that divided all claims into eight general categories and
briefly analyzed each group. Senate Banking Hearing,supra note 1, at 28-29.
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nies, contractors, and other corporations that did business with Iran
before the fall of the Shah.

B.

THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE AGREEMENT

The United States' effort to secure the safe release of the hos-

tages and protect the legitimate interests of U.S. banks and other
claimants in Iranian assets culminated in the Hostage Agreement.
The Agreement rests on two general principles. First, that the

United States would restore "the financial position of Iran, insofar as
possible, to that which existed prior to Nov. 14, 1979." Second, that
the governments of the United States and Iran would terminate all
litigation between each government and the nationals of the other
party and would "bring about the settlement and termination of all
such claims through binding arbitration."2 4
To restore Iran to its financial position of November 14, 1979,
while mollifying the antipathy between Iran and the United States,
the Hostage Agreement precisely detailed the procedure by which

the United States would unblock and transfer to Iran over $11 billion. In understanding the financial settlement, it is helpful to think
of the frozen Iranian assets in four categories: 25 $2.5 billion in the
form of gold bullion and securities held in the Federal Reserve Bank

of New York; $5.5 billion in interest bearing deposit accounts in
overseas branches of U.S. banks; $2.2 billion in deposits and securities held in various U.S. branches of U.S. banks; and $1 to 1.5 billion
26
of other Iranian assets in the United States.

The Hostage Agreement required the United States to establish

an escrow account in the name of the Algerian Central Bank in a
mutually agreeable central bank.27 Immediately after signing the
Agreement the United States transferred into this escrow account the
Iranian assets that had been held in the Federal Reserve Bank of
24. Declaration, supra note 1, General Principles.
25. For lucid descriptions of the complicated financial transactions the Hostage
Agreement called for, see Senate Banking Hearing,supranote 1, at 11-14 (prepared statement of Harold H. Saunders, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs); id at 20-27 (prepared statement of Robert Carswell, Former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury); House ForeignAffairs Hearings,supra note 2, at 21-24
(prepared statement of Harold H. Saunders, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs).
26. This fourth category of Iranian assets consisted of properties other than funds,
securities, and deposits, including personal property, real property, and accounts payable. House ForeignAffairs Hearings,supra note 2, at 195 (statement of Walter J. Stoessel,
Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs); Senate BankingHearing,supra note 1, at
25 (prepared statement of Robert Carswell, Former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury).
27. Declaration, supra note I, Points II and III, para. 2. The Bank of England agreed
to serve as escrow depositary. See also 31 C.F.R. § 535.210 (1981).
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New York and in the overseas branches of U.S. banks.2 8 This

amounted to $7.955 billion.29 The successful transfer of these funds
into escrow triggered the release of the fifty-two Americans from

Iran.30 When the plane carrying the former hostages safely moved
out of Iranian airspace, the Bank of England, depositary of the

escrow account, transferred a portion of the assets in the account to
31

Iran.

The terms of the Agreement further provided that the United

States would transfer the remaining Iranian assets, those assets on
deposit in U.S. branches of U.S. banks and other assets in the United

32
States, to Iran within six months of the signing of the documents.

As the $2.2 billion in deposits in the U.S. branches of U.S. banks

were transferred to Iran, the Agreement called for one-half to be
deposited in an interest bearing security account in another central
bank. 33 When the assets in the special security account reached $1

billion, the balance of the bank deposits were to be transferred
directly to Iran.34 This $1 billion security account would provide the
funds for the payment of awards of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal against Iran. The Government of Iran agreed to maintain
$500 million in the account at all times to
a minimum balance of
35
judgments.
satisfy the
28. Declaration, supra note 1, Points II and III, paras. 4-5; 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.211-.212
(1981).
29. Undertakings, supra note 1, para. 1.
30. Id;House ForeignAffaiisHearings,supra note 2, at 140 (statement of Warren M.
Christopher, Former Deputy Secretary of State).
31. Declaration, supra note 1, Points II and III, para. 3. The Bank of England only
transferred 36% of the escrow funds on the day Iran released the hostages: of the $7.55
billion in the account, the Bank of England transferred $3.667 billion back to the United
States to pay off Iranian debts to U.S. banks, the Bank retained $1.418 billion in the
escrow account to pay disputed amounts between the U.S. banks and Iran, and thus only
paid over to Iran $2.88 billion when Iran released the Americans. Undertakings, supra
note 1,para. 2; HouseForeignAffairs Hearings,supra note 2, at 140 (statement of Warren
M. Christopher, Former Deputy Secretary of State); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,
supra note 1, at 29 (statement of Warren M. Christopher, Former Deputy Secretary of
State).
32. Declaration, supra note 1, Points II and III, para. 6. 31 C.F.R. § 535.213 (1981).
33. Declaration, supra note 1, Points II and III, para. 7. Iran and the United States
later concluded arrangements to establish a security account at N.V. Settlement Bank of
the Netherlands. Department of State, Public Notice 772, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,057 (1981).
34. Declaration, supra note 1, Points II and III, para. 7.
35. Id This provision greatly concerns American claimants. They are not convinced
that Iran will faithfully replenish the security account. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1981, at D2,
col. 3; Nat'l LU., Mar. 2, 1981, at 3. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1982, at All, col. 1.
American officials have acknowledged the claimants' concerns, but are confident that
Iran will abide by the terms of the Agreement. They optimistically refer to the fund as a
"bottomless pitcher." These officials point out that the hostage crisis tarnished Iran's
reputation in the international community, and argue that Iran will not risk further damaging its national honor by failing to implement the Agreement. Furthermore, the
Agreement provides that a judgment of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is
enforceable against either government in the courts of any nation in accordance with
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To fully resolve the hostage crisis, the United States and Iran
agreed on a method "for U.S. nationals to pursue their commercial

claims against Iran, while at the same time responding to Iran's
demand for the return of its frozen assets."' 36

President Carter

agreed to immediately terminate all litigation against Iran in American courts, 37 and "to promote the settlement" of those claims.3 8 The
39
parties agreed that claims not settled within six to nine months of

the entry into force of the Agreement would be submitted to binding
third-party arbitration. 40 The Tribunal, officially known as the Iranforum laws. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 1, Art. IV. Thus, a dissatisfied
claimant could pursue Iran across the globe, attaching its oil revenues in order to enforce
the Tribunal's award. See House ForeignAffairs Hearings,supra note 2, at 216 (statement of Mark Feldman, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State); Senate Foreign
RelationsHearings,supra note 1, at 61, 67 (statement of Warren M. Christopher, Former
Deputy Secretary of State).
36. House ForeignAffairs Hearings,supra note 2, at 142 (statement of Warren M.
Christopher, Former Deputy Secretary of State).
37. Declaration, supra note 1, General Principles (B).
38. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 1, Art. I. As set forth in the general
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the
United States agreed to terminate the prosecution of pending and future claims of the
United States or its nationals relating to:
(A) the seizure of the 52 United States nationals on November 4, 1979, (B) their
subsequent detention, (C) injury to United States property or property of the
United States nationals within the United States Embassy compound in Tehran
after November 3, 1979, and (D) injury to the United States nationals or their
property as a result of popular movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the Government of Iran.
Declaration, supra note 1, Points II and III, para. 11.
The Agreement's definition of United States "national" requires the United States to
also terminate claims arising from a U.S. ownership interest in an Iranian corporation if
that ownership does not entail control of the corporation. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 1, Art. VII(2).
Furthermore, the government of the United States agreed to withdraw its claims pending before the International Court of Justice. Declaration, supranote 1, Points II and III,
para. 11. In early 1980, the United States took its case against Iran before the International Court of Justice. Iran ignored the entire proceeding. On May 24, 1980, the International Court of Justice ordered Iran to release the hostages, return the American
Embassy building to the United States, and pay damages. The International Court of
Justice kept the case open pending release of the hostages. Pursuant to the terms of the
Hostage Agreement, the United States moved to dismiss the case on April 6, 1981. In its
petition to the Court, however, the United States reserved the right to re-open the proceedings if Iran should breach the Agreement. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1981, at A4, col. 3.
39. The Agreement calls for a six-month settlement period that could be extended
once by three months at the request of either party. At the request of the Government of
Iran the parties extended the settlement period to October 19, 1981. Department of State,
Public Notice 763, 46 Fed. Reg. 36,278 (1981).
40. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 1, Art. I.
For purposes of settlement and, if necessary, presentation of claims to the Tribunal,
the Agreement divided all claims into two categories: claims for less than $250,000 and
claims for $250,000 or more. Id Art. III. United States claimants with large claims
($250,000 or more) would negotiate a settlement with Iran on an individual basis. On
April 27, 1981, the Government of Iran officially notified the Department of State that it
was ready to negotiate with the claimants. Department of State, Public Notice 753, 46
Fed. Reg. 25,026 (1981). Iran requested that the settlement negotiations take place in
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4
United States Claims Tribunal, is composed of nine members: '

three from the United States, three from Iran, and three selected by
the first six. 42 The Agreement specified that the seat of the Tribunal
would be The Hague, the Netherlands, 43 and that except to the

extent modified by the parties, the members would conduct business
in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Com-

mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).44

Vienna, Austria. Department of State, Public Notice 763, 46 Fed. Reg. 36,277 (1981).
The B.F. Goodrich Company announced that it expected to be the first claimant to be
paid out of the $1 billion account. It reached a privately negotiated settlement with Iran
for $182 thousand on a claim of $351 thousand. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1982, at DI, col. 1.
The United States government assumed responsibility for negotiating a lump-sum settlement of the smaller claims (under $250,000). Department of State, Public Notice 749,
46 Fed. Reg. 19,893 (1981). For a description of typical claims falling into this smallclaims category, see Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1982, at 18, col. 3. If successful, the group
settlement would eliminate 2,795 of the estimated 5,000 claims against Iran. Id If the
United States government fails to negotiate a settlement, the Agreement requires the
United States government to submit these claims to the Tribunal. Claims Settlement
Declaration, supra note I, Art. III (3). At the close of the settlement period, October 19,
1981, the United States had not negotiated a lump-sum settlement of the smaller claims.
Department of State, Public Notice 775, 46 Fed. Reg. 49,695 (1981).
The Agreement provides for a three-month period (October 20, 1981-January 19,
1982) during which the United States, acting on behalf of the smaller claimants, and
other claimants may file their claims with the Tribunal. Claims Settlement Declaration,
supra note 1, Art. III (4). On November 18, 1981, the United States fied a claim on
behalf of the smaller claimants, seeking an award of at least $180 million in compensation for their losses. Department of State, Public Notice 781, 46 Fed. Reg. 57,812 (1981).
41. The Agreement provided that the Tribunal could consist of nine members or
such larger multiple of three as the parties agreed were necessary. Claims Settlement
Declaration, supra note 1,Art. III (1). The parties agreed on placing only nine people on
the Tribunal, although the United States would have liked thirty arbitrators to speed the
processing of the claims. Nat'l L.J., Apr. 20, 1981, at 5.
42. The American members of the Tribunal are Howard M. Holtzmann, a New York
lawyer and expert in international arbitration, George H. Aldrich, a Virginia lawyer and
member of the United Nations International Law Commission, and Richard M. Mosk, a
Los Angeles lawyer. Iran's members include Tehran law professors Mahmoud M.
Kashani, and Shafey Shafeiei, a former judge. A third appointee, Seyyed H. Enayat, a
former Foreign Ministry legal aide, unexpectedly resigned and returned to Iran in early
1982. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1982, at All, col. 1. The jointly selected members are Gunnar Lagergren, a former Swedish court of appeals judge and now a member of the permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague; Pierre Bellet, a former chief justice of
France's Supreme Court; and Niels Mangaard, a justice on Sweden's Court of Appeals.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at DI, col. 3.
43. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 1, Art. VI (I).
44. Id Art. 111 (2). The United Nations recently promulgated the UNCITRAL rules
as an alternative to older arbitral regimes, such as that of the International Chamber of
Commerce, that some lesser developed nations viewed as being too closely attuned to the
commercial interests of industrialized nations. Senate Banking Hearing,supra note 1, at
137-38 (prepared statement of John F. Olson, an attorney representing several claimants). For a detailed description of the modifications the parties made to the Uncitral
arbitration rules, see e.g., Department of State, Public Notice 764, 46 Fed. Reg. 37,418
(1981); Department of State, Public Notice 775, 46 Fed. Reg. 49,695 (1981).
At the opening of the claims filing period, the parties had not yet agreed on several
important procedural matters that the Hostage Agreement did not address. These
unresolved issues included: fixing the length of time the Government of Iran could have
to respond to the claimants' charges; deciding upon the degree of secrecy that should
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The Hostage Agreement specifies the types of claims over which
the Tribunal will have jurisdiction, and the types of claims that lie

outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The Tribunal will have jurisdiction to decide (1) claims and related counterclaims outstanding on

the date of the Agreement by the nationals of either party against the
government of the other, (2) official claims of the Governments of

the United States and Iran against each other arising out of contracts
for the purchase and sale of goods and services, and (3) any dispute
regarding the interpretation or performance of any provision of the
45

Agreement.
Specifically excluded from the Tribunals jurisdiction, however,

46
are claims (1) relating to the seizure or detention of the hostages,
injury to United States property or property within the compound of
the United States Embassy, and injury to persons or property as a
surround the arbitration process and the manner by which the hearings would be
recorded; disposing of the interest accumulated on the $1 billion security account at the
N.V. Settlement Bank (the United States would like the interest to revert to the account
and be available to pay claims); and assigning responsibility between the parties to pay
the N.V. Settlement Bank's administrative costs and to guarantee the bank against future
claims on attachments. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at Dl, col. 3; id, Mar. 8, 1982, at
All, col. 1; Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1982, at 18, col. 3.
45. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note I, Art. II.
46. The provisions of the Agreement that prevent the hostages and their families
from pursuing their legal remedies against Iran in American courts and in the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal have been termed one of the "most nettlesome aspects of
the accords." N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1981, at Al, col. 2. The United States government
defends the exclusion of these claims by contending that the hostages' claims were of
little value since Iran would answer a tort claim brought in a United States court with a
very strong sovereign immunity defense. House Foreign4ffairsHearings,supra note 2, at
95 (statement of Harold H. Saunders, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs). Warren M. Christopher, former Deputy Secretary of State
and head of the U.S. negotiating team, believed he was not giving a lot away when the
United States government waived these claims. Mr. Christopher also defends the move
by explaining that as early as August 1980, the Department of State secured the approval
of most of the hostages' families to waive the claims. The families did not want negotiation over these claims to delay the release of the hostages. Id at 143 (statement of Warren M. Christopher, Former Deputy Secretary of State).
The American hostages are not without some relief. They and their families will benefit from the provisions of the Hostage Relief Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. § 5561 (Supp. IV
1980). In addition, President Carter ordered the formation of the President's Commission on Hostage Compensation to make recommendations regarding special financial
compensation the hostages should receive to supplement their award under the Hostage
Relief Act of 1980. Exec. Order No. 12,285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7931 (1981). That Commission.
completed its work and recommended to the President that the hostages (with the exception of the one nongovernment employee among the hostages) receive $12.50 a day for
their 444 days in captivity and unlimited medical and health benefits for those hostages
suffering disabilities stemming from their detention. N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1981, at Al,
col. 6.
Despite the prohibition in the Agreement, several hostages and their families brought
actions against the Government of Iran alleging that the detention violated their diplomatic privileges, immunities, and civil rights. The United States government quickly
moved to dismiss the suits. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1981, at A10, col. 6; id, Feb. 14, 1981, at
16, col. 2; id, Mar. 8, 1981, at A32, col. 1.
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result of popular movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution

in Iran that were not actions of the Government of Iran, 47 and (2)
claims arising under the terms of a binding contract specifically pro-

viding that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdic48
tion of the Iranian courts.
47. 31 C.F.R. § 535.216 (1981). The meaning of the phrase "popular movements in
the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran," and thus the scope of this exclusion, is not
at all clear. For an informed discussion of this matter, see Senate ForeignRelations Hearings, supra note 1, at 186-87 (statement of Mark Feldman, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State).
48. The Iranian "choice of forum" clause, inserted in the Agreement at the insistence
of Iran's Parliament, is one of the most controversial and significant provisions in the
Hostage Agreement, and has given commercial claimants much cause for concern. Many
claimants-perhaps as many as one-third, representing hundreds of millions of dollars of
claims-may be excluded from access to the Tribunal because of this provision. Senate
Banking Hearing,supra note 1, at 145 (prepared statement of John F. Olson, an attorney
representing several claimants).
Whether the Tribunal will reject jurisdiction over these claims depends on how
broadly the Tribunal members construe the exclusion. Few of the contracts that will be
the subject of the arbitration contain a "choice of forum" clause drafted in the exact
language of the exclusion clause. But many of the contracts do contain language tying
resolution of disputes in some manner to Iranian courts, Iranian law, or arbitration in
Iran. See, e.g., id at 87 (statement of Arthur Albertson, Vice President of CBI Industries,
a claimant). If the exclusion clause is broadly construed by members of the Tribunalonly one third of whom are Americans-many claims will be excluded from the
arbitration.
The United States government is aware of the claimants' concerns and has urged the
claimants to argue to the Tribunal that jurisdiction properly lies with the Tribunal. The
claimants should seek to convince the arbitrators that the exclusion clause is too narrow
to cover their claims or, by invoking the doctrine of "changed circumstances" that is
preserved in the Agreement, Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 1, Art. V, the
claimants should argue that they did not bargain for courts of the Islamic government of
the Ayatollah Khomeini to adjudicate their contract disputes. One Reagan Administration official is of the opinion that the lawyers for Iran may also desire the Tribunal to
read this exclusion provision narrowly. The official suggests that Iran will prefer to have
the Tribunal resolve as many of these claims as possible because they are afraid of how
the U.S. courts will deal with the issues if the claimants resume their domestic litigation.
Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 1, at 187 (statement of Larry L. Simms,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice).
N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1981, at 5, col. 1.
The government's views are contained in the Statement of Interest the Department of
Justice filed with the federal courts that were hearing or had pending claims against Iran.
The Statement of Interest was made a part of one claimant's brief in a case pending in
the Federal Court for the Northern District of Texas. Brief of Plaintiff Electronic Data
Systems Corporation.Iran in Support of Application for Preliminary Injunction in Aid of
Judgment, Exhibit A at 24-25, Elec. Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of the Gov't
of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1981). [hereinafter cited as Statement of Interest].
The interpretative problem that this exclusion clause poses highlights the difficulties
claimants and their attorneys face as they struggle to understand the Hostage Agreement.
The lawyers are handicapped by the secrecy that surrounds the negotiations; there are no
public documents that explain how the parties drafted the Agreement and what they
contemplated when they chose certain terms and phrases. One newspaper account
reveals that the United States negotiators purposefully inserted three separate phrases
into the Agreement to add ambiguity to the non-negotiable Iranian "choice of forum
clause." Nat'l L.J., Apr. 20, 1981, at 5. One law firm tried to overcome the handicap that
this lack of negotiating information posed by filing a Freedom of Information Act
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C. REAGAN'S IMPRIMATUR
President Reagan declined to publicly endorse the Hostage
Agreement during his first thirty days in office. After an interagency
committee carefully reviewed the documents and reached conclusions as to the Agreement's legality, Reagan agreed to implement the
accords. 49 He gave to them, however, an interpretation that substantially narrowed the reach of the Hostage Agreement. He then
authorized the Treasury Department to immediately issue regulations that would implement his Administration's understanding of
the terms of the Agreement.50
The Hostage Agreement purports to cancel all claims, attachments, and proceedings against Iran in American courts.5 ' Reagan,
however, did not call for an immediate termination of all litigation.
Rather, he ordered the federal courts only to suspend the prosecution 52 of all claims over which the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal arguably had jurisdiction.5 3 Reagan's interpretation confficts
sharply with Article VII of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which
provides that "[c]laims referred to the Arbitral Tribunal shall, as of
the date of filing such claims with the Tribunal, be considered
excludedfrom thejurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the United
'54
States, or of any other court."
request with the Department of State to obtain drafts of all documents relating to the
Agreement. Nat'l L.J., Mar. 2, 1981, at 3.
49. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981), SUSPENSIONS OF CERTAIN
LITIGATION AGAINST IRAN: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 25, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 1, at 174-75 (statement of Walter Stoessel, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs); N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1981, at Al,col 2; id, Feb. 17, 1981, at Al,col. 1.
50. The new regulations are scattered throughout 31 C.F.R. pt. 535 (1981). These
Treasury Regulations amended as necessary the Iranian Asset Control Regulations that
the Treasury Department issued when President Carter first imposed the freeze on
November 14, 1979.
51. Declaration, supra note 1, General Principles (B). See supra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text.
52. In effect, the President ordered the courts to transfer the claims to a special "suspense calendar." Nat'l L.J., Mar. 2, 1981, at 3.
53. Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 1, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981); 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(a)
(1981).
The Executive order also provides that the suspension applies to all claims either presently pending or ified after the date of the Executive Order (§ 1); that claimants are not
prohibited from commencing an action for purposes of tolling a period of limitations
(id); that nothing in the Order shall require dismissal of any action for want of prosecution (§ 2); that nothing in the Order shall apply t6 any claim concerning the validity or
payment of a standby letter of credit, performance or payment bond, or other similar
instrument (§ 5); and, that nothing in the Order shall prohibit the assertion of a counterclaim or set-off by a United States national in any judicial proceeding pending or commenced by Iran or its entities (§ 6).
54. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 1, Art. VII(2) (emphasis added).
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The implementing regulations provide that if the Tribunal
determines that it does not have jurisdiction over a claim the suspension of that claim shall terminate, and the claimant may pursue his
remedies in U.S. courts. 5" Suspended claims shall be fully discharged and removed from the docket of the U.S. courts only after
the Tribunal determines on the merits that the claimant is entitled to
no recovery, or determines on the merits that the claimant is entitled
56
to a recovery and Iran satisfies the judgment.
Although an American forum is guaranteed for those claims
that the Tribunal excludes, in most cases the Agreement will operate
to remove jurisdiction from the U.S. court to the international Arbitral Tribunal.
II. DAMES & MOORE v. REGAN
Litigants immediately challenged the constitutionality of the
Hostage Agreement in federal courts across the country.5 7 The
Agreement was questioned in nearly four hundred lawsuits against
Iran or Iranian government entities 58 involving claims of over twenty
billion dollars.5 9 The district courts divided over the validity of the
Hostage Agreement 6o but both circuit courts that addressed the issue
found that the Agreement was a valid exercise of Presidential
authority. 6 1 A final ruling on the issue was necessary before July 19,
1981 because Iran could have considered the United States to be in
breach of the Agreement unless it released attached Iranian assets by
that date.62 Therefore, on June 11, 1981 the Supreme Court granted
55. Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981); 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(e)
(1981). The class of claimants that stands to benefit the most from Reagan's interpretation of the Agreement are those commercial claimants whose claim is based upon a contract that contained an Iran "choice of forum" clause. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text. If the Tribunal broadly construes the exclusion clause of the Agreement and thereby excludes these claimants froih the arbitration proceeding, they may
pursue a remedy against Iran in the United States courts.
This interpretation will benefit other claimants whose claims the Tribunal may exclude
pursuant to other ambiguously-worded clauses in the Agreement. The only claimants
definitely foreclosed from a remedy in both the U.S. courts and in the Tribunal are the
hostages and their families. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1981, at 5, col. I.
56. Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 4, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981); 31 C.F.R. § 534.222(")
(19&1).
57. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1981, at D15, col. 1, indicating that litigation involving
Iranian assets was pending in at least 40 federal district and circuit courts.
58. Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Winer, New Chinks in the Iran Deal, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 2, 1981, col. I.
59. Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
60. See supra note 6.

61. Id
62. The Agreement called for the United States to transfer attached Iranian assets
within six months of the initialing of the Agreement. Declaration, supra note 1,Points II
and III, para. 6.
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certiorari in Dames & Moore v. Regan 63 on July 2, 1981 the Court
64
announced its decision upholding the Hostage Agreement.
The Court separately analyzed the President's authority to dissolve the pre-judgment attachments and to suspend claims pending
in United States courts. The Court concluded that the President
enjoyed statutory and constitutional authority to perform both acts.
The Court first held that the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (IEEPA)65 endowed the President with the requisite
power to dissolve the pre-judgment attachments and to transfer the
Iranian assets out of this country.66 The Court stated that because
the President nullified the attachments and transfered the Iranian

assets pursuant to specific congressional authorization, his actions
deserved "the widest latitude of judicial interpretation." 67 In reach-

ing its conclusion the Court noted that Dames & Moore obtained its
pre-judgment attachment of the defendant's property after President
Carter had frozen the Iranian assets in this country. Thus, the Court
reasoned that having acted pursuant to Treasury Department regula-

tions permitting pre-judgment attachments, Dames & Moore was on
68
notice of the contingent nature of its interest in the frozen assets.
The Court more elaborately analyzed the President's authority

to suspend the claims against Iran pending in American courts. The
63. Dames & Moore v. Regan, cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3071 (1981).
64. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S.Ct. 2972 (1981). Dames & Moore had filed suit
in the District Court for the Central District of California on December 19, 1979, alleging
that it was owed over $3 million plus interest for services performed under a contract
with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Pursuant to Treasury Department Regulations, Dames & Moore obtained pre-judgment attachments against property of the
defendant. On January 27, 1981 the District Court awarded Dames & Moore summary
judgment against the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization for the
amount claimed under the contract plus interest. Subsequent district court orders prevented Dames & Moore from executing its judgment pending appeal by the Government
of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization and vacated all pre-judgment attachments
Dames & Moore had obtained against the Iranian defendants.
On April 28, Dames & Moore filed a separate action in the District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of the Hostage Agreement and the
Treasury Department Regulations implementing the Agreement. On May 28, 1981 the
District Court dismissed the second action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Dames & Moore fied a notice of appeal with the Ninth Circuit on
June 3, 1981. On June 4, the Treasury Department issued regulations requiring the
transfer out of the United States of all Iranian assets by June 19, 1981. Dames & Moore
then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari before judgment. The Court
granted the petition for the writ and adopted an expedited briefing schedule. The Court
heard oral argument on June 24, 1981. 101 S.Ct. 2972, 2977-81.
65. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. I11978). See infra notes 104-34 and accompanying text.
66. 101 S.Ct. 2972, 2984.
67. Id (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
68. Id at 2983. See also 31 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1980), which provided that "the provisions of this part and any rulings, licenses, authorizations, instructions, orders, or forms
issued thereunder may be amended, modified, or revoked at any time."
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69
Court concluded that neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act,
which President Carter had relied on, provided specific statutory
authority for the termination of litigation. 70 The statutes were highly
relevant, however, as indicating congressional acceptance of the
broad scope of Presidential authority in emergencies such as the Iranian hostage crisis. 7 1 The Court buttressed this conclusion with evidence of a long history of congressional acquiesence in Presidential
power to settle claims of American nationals against foreign governments.72 The Court forcefully rejected Dames & Moore's argument
that the Executive Order suspending the litigation in American
courts circumscribed the jurisdiction of the federal courts in violation of article III of the Constitution. 73 Furthermore, the Court
refused to read the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA) as prohibiting the President from settling the claims of U.S.
nationals against foreign governments. 74 Rather, the Court held that
Congress intended the FSIA to simply remove the issue of sovereign
immunity as a barrier to suit for U.S. litigants pursuing foreign governments in American courts. The Court therefore held that, in light
of the inferences it drew from congressional legislation and from the
history of congressional acquiescence in executive claims settlements, the President possessed the authority to suspend the claims
75
pending against Iran in American courts.
The Court refused to consider whether the suspension of litiga76
tion constituted a taking within the scope of the fifth amendment.
Though all parties agreed that that issue was not ripe for review, the
Court did hold that the Court of Claims would have jurisdiction to
hear claims that the Hostage Agreement effected an unconstitutional
77
taking.

III.

RELEVANT STATUTES

Complete consideration of the issues presented in the Hostage
Agreement requires analysis of three statutory regimes: the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),78 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 79 and the century old Hostage
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976). See infra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
101 S.Ct. 2972, 2984-85.
Id at 2985.
Id at 2986-88.
Id at 2989.
Id at 2989-90.
Id at 2990.
Id at 2991.
Id at 2992.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. I 1978).
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Act. 80 The latter two statutes provide support for the President's
authority to agree to the terms of the accord with Iran; the former

does not. The FSIA precisely details the circumstances under which
a litigant may sue foreign governments and their state agencies in
federal courts, and prescribes the procedure for the pre-judgment
attachment of the assets of a foreign government. At first blush it
seems that if claimants sued Iran pursuant to the terms of the FSIA,

the President could not interfere with the litigation. 8' The IEEPA
and the Hostage Act, however, give the President great latitude in

dealing with international crises, which may include the power to
interfere with domestic litigation.8 2 The question thus becomes

which of these statutory schemes should govern the litigation against
Iran.
A.

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF

1976

The FSIA codifies four types of immunity that a foreign state,
its agencies, and instrumentalities enjoy under American law: juris84
dictional immunity, 83 immunity from pre-judgment attachment,
85
immunity from post-judgment attachment, and immunity from
execution upon a judgment.86 The FSIA provides for the immunity
of a foreign sovereign from jurisdiction in American courts except in
specified circumstances. 87 The exceptions include situations in
which the sovereign is deemed to have waived its jurisdictional

immunity, 88 and in which the sovereign is engaged in commercial

activity that has an effect in the United States. 89 In the Iranian asset
litigation, the claimants sought federal court jurisdiction under one

or both of these exceptions to jurisdictional immunity. 90
80. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976). The 40th Congress passed this Act in 1868.
81. The plaintiff in Dames & Moore made and lost this argument in the Supreme
Court. 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2989-91 (1981). See supra note 73-75 and accompanying text.
82. Presidents Carter and Reagan relied on these two statutes as authority for interrupting Iranian assets litigation. Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-85, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-32
(1981); Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
84. Id § 1609.
85. Id
86. Id
87. Id §§ 1604, 1605-1607.
88. Id § 1605(a)(1).
89. Id § 1605(a)(2). Other exceptions include suits that the foreign government itself
has instituted (§ 1607), suits involving violations of international law (§ 1605(a)(3)), and
suits involving certain torts committed in the United States (§ 1605(a)(5)).
90. See e.g., Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 390
(D.N.J. 1979) (commercial exception and waiver exception); New England Merchant's
Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (waiver exception). Iran's waiver of its jurisdictional immunity is expressed in the
Treaty of Amity, Aug. 15, 1955, Iran-United States, art. XI, 8 U.S.T. 901, 908, T.I.A.S.
No. 3853:
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The FSIA did not substantially alter the criteria to be considered before subjecting a foreign sovereign to suit in the United
States. It did, however, significantly alter the procedure by which
the determination of immunity was to be made. 91 Before Congress
passed the FSIA, the Department of State determined a foreign government's immunity from suit on a case-by-case basis. 92 The
Department of State would accept legal briefs and sometimes hear
oral arguments before making its recommendation for or against
immunity to the appropriate court. 93 The Department of State's recommendation was binding on the court, even if it appeared that the
94
Department had considered political factors in making its decision.
To achieve one of its major purposes-depoliticizing the immunization process 9 5 -the FSIA provides for the judicial determination of
sovereign immunity questions. 96 Accordingly, in the Iranian asset
No enterprise of either [the United States or Iran], including corporations,
associations, and government agencies and instrumentalities, which is publicly
owned or controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, industrial, shipping or
other business activities within the territories of the other High Contracting
Party, claim or enjoy, either for itself or for its property, immunity therein from
taxation, suit, execution of judgment or other liability to which privately owned
and controlled enterprises are subject therein.

Id

4.

91. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN
SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES, H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 19,
reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6606, 6616; SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, DEFINE JURISDICTION OF U.S. COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN

STATES, S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976).
The United States had already announced its formal abandonment of the "absolute
theory" of foreign sovereign immunity that Justice Marshall expressed in The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The abandonment came in the
form of the '"Tate Letter" that declared that the Department of State would no longer
grant immunity to friendly sovereigns in suits arising from private or commercial activity. 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984-85 (1952). The Tate Letter did not, however, offer specific
guidelines for determining when a state's acts were private or commercial. See Carl,
Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009, 1011-12 (1979); Kahale & Vega, Immunity
and Jurisdictio Toward a Unform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 211-18 (1979); von Mehren, The ForeignSovereign ImmunitiesAct of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 41 (1978).
92. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 91, at 7; S. REP. No. 1310, supra note 91, at 10.
93. Kahale & Vega, supra note 91, at 215.
94. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 91, at 7; S. REP. No. 1310, supra note 91, at 10;
Kahale & Vega, supra note 91, at 215-16; see also Note, The ForeignSovereign Immunities
Act of 1976.. Giving the Plaintqfy9fis Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 543, 547-49
(1977).
95. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 91, at 7; S. REp. No. 1310, supra note 91, at 8-9.
See aiso Kahale & Vega, supra note 91, at 219-20; von Mehren, supra note 91, at 45.
96. "The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims
of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests ofjustice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United
States courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
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litigation the lower federal courts decided that Iran was not immune

from the American suits.
Under the FSIA a foreign state is immune from pre-judgment
attachment of its assets unless two conditions are met: first, the for-

eign state has explicitly waived its immunity from pre-judgment
attachment; and second, the purpose of the attachment is to secure a

97
judgment that may be entered rather than to obtain jurisdiction.

The district courts have disagreed on the validity, under the FSIA, of

the pre-judgment attachments of Iranian assets. The courts split on
whether the Iran-United States Treaty of Amity constitutes a waiver
of immunity from pre-judgment attachment. 98 The Hostage Agree-

ment purports to remove federal court jurisdiction to hear suits
against Iran and to nullify the attachments obtained pursuant to the
freeze.

In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the American company argued
that passage of the FSIA in 1976 deprived the President of any

power he may have possessed to suspend domestic litigation as part
of a claims settlement with a foreign country. 99 Since the FSIA gave

the judiciary the exclusive voice in determining the sovereign immunity of foreign governments, Dames & Moore maintained that Presi-

dent Carter's interference with the litigation, after the courts had
decided Iran was not immune from suit, was an unconstitutional circumscription of the courts' jurisdiction under article III. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument. 0 0 First, the Court character-

ized the President's action as a change in the substantive rule of law
governing the suits, rather than as a modification of federal court
jurisdiction.' 0 ' Second, the Court read the FSIA narrowly. Accord-

ing to the Court, when Congress passed the statute, it did not intend
97. Id § 1610(d).
98. See supra note 90 for the pertinent portion of the Treaty. Chief Judge Fisher of
the New Jersey District Court has held that although the Treaty of Amity is not an
explicit waiver of immunity for the purposes of § 1610(d), a reasonable reading of that
Treaty indicates that it was intended to allow pre-judgment attachment and that § 1609
preserves that intention. Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp.
383, 394-95 (D.N.J. 1979).
Judge Duffy of the Southern District of New York maintains that the pre-judgment
attachments of Iranian assets are invalid under the FSIA because of the conspicuous
absence of an express waiver of immunity in the Treaty. New England Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 126 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). Judge Duffy went on to hold, however, that the Carter-imposed freeze of Iranian
assets overcomes the immunity from pre-judgment attachment that FSIA would otherwise protect. Id at 130. Judge Kellcher also held that in the Iran-United States Treaty
of Amity, Iran did not explicitly waive its immunity from pre-judgment attachments.
Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Gov't of Iran, 513 F. Supp. 864, 880 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
99. 101 S.Ct. 2972, 2989 (1981).
100. Id But see Marsehalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 81-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
101. 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2989.
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to impair the President's ability to conduct foreign policy. The
Court stated that presidential discretion in this area includes a

power to settle American claims against foreign countries. 102
B.
L

THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT

History and Policy

The relevant grant of authority under the IEEPA, drawn
10 3
directly from the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA),
provides
[T]he President may...
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any
banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any
interest of any foreign country or a national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest;
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of
by any person, or with
1 4
the United States. 0

The primary purpose of the IEEPA, which became law in 1977,
was to redefine and delimit the President's power to regulate interna-

tional economic transactions during wars or national emergencies.10 5
Two developments accounted for passage of the IEEPA. First, section 5(b) of the TWEA had become an "essentially unlimited grant
of authority" to the President.10 6 To illustrate, the fact that President
102. Id at 2989-90.
103. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976).
104. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (Supp. I 1978).
105.

HousE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY

ACT REFORM LEGISLATION, H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1977); SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING, HousING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY

ECONOMIC POWERS LEGISLATION, S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4540, 4541. See also Note, PresidentialEmergency
Powers Related to InternationalEconomic Transactions: CongressionalRecognition of
Customary Authority, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515 (1978).
106. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 105, at 7. Section 5(b), as amended by the Banking Act of 1933, conferred upon the Executive four major groups of powers for use in
time of congressionally declared war or other Presidentially declared national
emergency:
(a) Regulatory powers with respect to foreign exchange, banking transfers,
coin, bullion, currency, and securities;
(b) Regulatory powers with respect to "any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest";
(c) The power to vest "any property or interest of any foreign country or
national thereof"; and
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Truman's declaration of emergency in 1950 at the time of the

Korean Conflict was never terminated, made it possible for the
TWEA to be the cited authority for four different presidential activities occurring as late as 1976.107 More specifically, there were four

major objections to continuing presidential reliance on the TWEA.
First, the TWEA was no longer a grant of authority reserved for

wartime use. 0 8 Second, Presidents had invoked the TWEA to support actions of an entirely domestic nature.' 0 9 Third, Congress had

no means of reviewing presidential exercise of the TWEA authority.

0

Fourth, the duration of the emergencies was limitless."'

(d) The powers to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell, or otherwise deal
with "such interest or property" in the interest of and for the benefit of the
United States.
Id at 2.
A survey of the history of its use reveals that Presidents were using their broad powers
under the TWEA in both the doinestic and international economic arenas. The President triggered his TWEA authority by declaring a national emergency. 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 5(b)(1) (1976).
107. The four mentioned activities were
(a) Promulgation of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, which provided
that all transactions between the U.S. and China, North Korea, Vietnam, and
Cambodia were prohibited except by license of the Department of the Treasury.
31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-.809 (1976).
(b) Promulgation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, which provided
that all transactions between the U.S. and Cuba were similarly prohibited, with
certain exceptions. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.809 (1976).
(c) Promulgation of the Transaction Control Regulations, which prohibited
U.S. persons from participating in shipping strategic goods to any of fourteen
Communist countries. 31 C.F.R. §§ 505.01-.60 (1976).
(d) Promulgation of the Foreign Funds Control Regulations, which continued
the World War II blockage of the assets of Czechoslovakia, Estonia, East Germany, Latvia and Lithuania. 31 C.F.R. §§ 520.01-.809 (1976).
108. The original language of the TWEA of 1917 limited the President's use of his
powers under the Act to wartime use only. In 1933, President Roosevelt declared a
national emergency, and under that emergency, a bank holiday to prevent gold hoarding.
The President took this domestic action citing § 5(b) of the TWEA for authority. When
Congress passed the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 it amended § 5(b) to provide that
the President could exercise his authority under that section in time of national emergency. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 105, at 4; S. REP. No. 466, supra note 105, at 2.
109. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 105, at 7; S. REP. No. 466, supra note 105, at 2.
110. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 105, at 7. In hearings before the Subcommittee on
International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on International
Relations, several respected scholars commented on the absence of any congressional
supervision or other objective criteria delimiting the proper scope of the President's
authority under the TWEA.
Professor Stanley D. Metzger, of the Georgetown University Law Center, commented
that
No statement of findings and policy, and no standards to guide its administration are set forth in section 5(b). There is no provision for congressional parThere is no provision for congressional consideration of
ticipation ....
whether a particular action remains provident after it is taken, and to terminate
it if not. There is no provision for Presidential reporting at intervals concerning
actions he has taken under section 5(b), with reasons for his actions.
Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld, of New York University Law School, remarked
similarly:
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The second development giving rise to the IEEPA was Con-

gress's passage, in 1976, of the National Emergencies Act." 2 That
Act provided that all powers and authorities the President possessed

as a result of any declaration of emergency still in effect on the date
of its passage would terminate two years from the date of enactment.

The National Emergencies Act then provided new procedures for the
declaration, conduct, and termination of future emergencies, including provision for congressional termination, by concurrent resolution, of a national emergency. The Act exempted from its coverage,
however, certain emergency power statutes then in use because of
their deemed importance for the continued functioning of the goveminent. One of these exempted statutes was section 5(b) of the
TWEA. Congress provided this exemption so that it could more
carefully study how to revise these important statutes.
The bill incorporating the IEEPA is the result of Congress's
careful review of section 5(b). 113 Congress passed the IEEPA in
1977, to deal with unusual or threatening situations involving the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.
The IEEPA grants Presidential power where one of these situations,
having its source wholly or partially abroad, causes the President to
declare a national emergency. 1 4 The TWEA is once again restricted
to wartime use. 15 In passing the IEEPA, Congress intended to provide the President with power to regulate only international ecoFirst, there seems to be no way under existing law to terminate a state of
emergency proclaimed by the President except by another Presidential proclamation; and no practical constraint limiting actions taken under emergency
authority to measures related to the emergency. The Trading With the Enemy
Act itself, and particularly section 5(b), is legislation without limit of time. It has
been in effect in its present [sic] form since 1941 and has had no expiration date
or requirement of congressional scrutiny or review. Second, the delegated
authority is not only broad: there are no criteria at alL Subject only to the existence of a national emergency, the power of the President, acting "through any
agency he may deisgnate" to affect property or transactions is virtually unlimited, provided there is at least some foreign connection in the property or transaction affected.
id at 8.
111. In its report, the House Committee on International Relations observed that:
[t]hese powers may be exercised so long as there is an unterminated declaration of national emergency on the books, whether or not the situation with
respect to which the emergency was declared bears any relationship to the situation with respect to which the President is using the authorities.
Id at 7.
112. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified in
scattered titles of U.S.C.).
113. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977).
114. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. 11 1978).
115. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(a), 91 Stat. 1626 (1977); H.R.
REP. No. 459, supra note 105, at 10, 15; S. REP. No. 466, supra note 105, at 4.
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nomic transactions, not purely domestic matters.116 Additionally,
Congress required the President, when possible, to consult with Con-

gress before exercising any of his power under the IEEPA, and mandated regular consultation so long as the President exercised such
powers.' 7 Congress further required the President to transmit to it a
detailed report immediately after each exercise of IEEPA authority.1 8 Congress reserved to itself authority to terminate any national

emergency and to prohibit further presidential exercise of IEEPA
power.'19
2. IEEPA and the Dissolution ofAttachments
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Supreme Court held that the

IEEPA provided specific congressional authorization for the President's nullification of pre-judgment attachments of Iranian assets. 20
Dames & Moore presented a relatively easy case because the Ameri-

can company obtained the attachment pursuant to Treasury Department licensing procedures after the November 1979 asset freeze.' 2 '
Treasury Department regulations clearly stated that all licenses
authorizing attachments were revocable at any time. 22 Therefore,
persons obtaining attachments pursuant to the regulations were on
notice that the President might alter their interest in the assets at any

time.
116. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 105, at 10-11.
117. 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (Supp. I1 1978).
118. Id § 1703(b). The President must specify:
(a) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority;
(b) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States;
(c) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise
of those authorities to deal with those circumstances;
(d) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those
circumstances; and
(e) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken
with respect to those countries.
119. Id § 1706(b).
120. 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2984.
121. The Court, in a footnote, dismissed Dames & Mooe's argument that only the
Treasury Department licenses to obtain attachments, not the attachments themselves,
were revocable. 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 n.6.
Dames & Moore also failed to persuade the Court that it acquired a property interest
in the attachment that remained vested even after the revocation of the licenses. The
Court, therefore, answered in the negative the claim that Dames & Moore deserved just
compensation under the fifth amendment for the nullification of its interest in the onceattached assets. Id Judge Duffy accepted Dames & Moore's line of argument in Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines.Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 98-100 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
122. 31 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1980).
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On this issue, Dames & Moore provides a sound conclusion.

Reading the FSIA and the IEEPA together, it is clear that Congress
intended the IEEPA, not the FSIA, to govern the control of foreign
assets in times of crisis. Congress passed the IEEPA to deal with
crises; it intended the FSIA to cover routine litigation. Indeed, even
Dames & Moore agreed that the President could have entirely forbidden the attachment of Iranian assets. 2 3 If this is so, there is no
valid justification for thwarting the President's efforts to do some-

thing less than fully barring attachments.
Two circuit courts agreed that the IEEPA authorized the President to nullify the attachment of Iranian assets.' 2 4 In addition, a
1953 Supreme Court opinion interpreting presidential authority

26
25
under the TWEA also supports this result.1 In Orvis v. Brownell,1

the Court empowered the Alien Property Custodian (acting under
presidential direction) to freely dispose of frozen assets in which U.S.
litigants had obtained post-freeze attachments. The attachments in

Orvis were ineffective against the President's authority to transfer,
vest, and dispose of the blocked assets as he saw fit.

3. IEEPA and the Termination of Litigation

Although the IEEPA endows the President with a variety of
powers, it does not specifically authorize the nullification of
claims. 27 The IEEPA only gives the President the authority to regu-

late international economic transactions.

28

123. 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 n.6.
124. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. 11 1978). See Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v.
Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981).
125. The Marschallk court disagreed with the treatment of this early case and distinguished it. Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'1 Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
126. 345 U.S. 183 (1953). In Orvis, U.S. litigants had obtained attachments against
the property of Japanese nationals that was subject to a Presidential blocking order
entered pursuant to § 5(b) of the TWEA. The Alien Property Custodian subsequently
"vested" the property against which the attachment was entered, and refused the litigants
a license to use vested funds in satisfaction of their judgment against the Japanese
nationals.
127. The dissolution of attachments is an action distinct from the termination of litigation. The claims themselves have "an existence apart from the attachments which
accompanied them." Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 (1981). As a
practical matter, a claimant whose attachment on the property of a foreign state is dissolved, but whose claim is not, may continue to litigate in a federal court. If the claimant
obtains a judgment, it may pursue the appropriate execution remedies under the FSIA.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611 (1976). Thus, it may execute on any property that Iran later
brings into the United States and which is not then frozen. The claimant may also
attempt to execute its judgment abroad. Therefore, one must consider separately the
cancellation of the claims and the nullification of the attachments.
128. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. 111978). See supra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, the question presented in the Hostage Agreement

litigation is whether suits that involve the property of a foreign government are "international economic transactions" under the

IEEPA. The IEEPA allows the President to "regulate" the "transfer" of property, 129 but that may not entail the power to remove the
suits from federal court. A literal reading of the statute does not

support an interpretation that such suits are international economic
transactions. A suit in a domestic court will at most determine the
rights to the disputed property. It will not necessarily dictate a
"transaction" involving the property.
Significantly, the statute's legislative history indicates a congressional concern for the ability of American citizens to recover claims
against foreign governments. 130 This history supports the President's
claim that the IEEPA authorizes actions that are related to a later
claims settlement. 13 1 But this legislative history will also support an

argument against the President's power to suspend claims. Domestic
plaintiffs, by focusing on the inconveniences and uncertainties of

arbitration at The Hague, can argue that the removal of the cases

32
frustrates, rather than enhances, their ability to recover from Iran.1
On balance, it seems that because the legislative history merely indi-

cates a concern for recovery against foreign governments, but does
not indicate how that recovery is to be obtained, it does not persua-

sively argue in favor of broad presidential authority. This is especially true in light of the fact that when Congress passed the IEEPA
129. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
130. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 105, at 17.
131. Letter from Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, refprintedin Senate Banking
Hearing,supra note 1, at 117. This argument is stronger if made in conjunction with an
argument that the President has inherent powers to settle claims against foreign governments. See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text. The government has defended
the provision in the Hostage Agreement that requires claimants to seek recovery against
Iran in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal by maintaining that the claimants are
better off in The Hague than they would have been in domestic courts. Many suits are
based on breaches of contracts that provided for arbitration instead of litigation, or that
provided that any litigation must occur in Iran. Also, claimants would have had to overcome the strong defense of sovereign immunity before many of the suits could have
proceeded. The Government saw the elimination of these barriers to suit as significant
benefits flowing to claimants from the Hostage Agreement. See e.g., Senate ForeignRelations Hearings, supra note 1,at 58 (statement of Warren M. Christopher, Former Deputy
Secretary of State).
132. Some claimants consider themselves worse off if they must resort to The Hague
to obtain recoveries against Iran. Going to Europe entails higher travel expenses. The
administrative costs of arbitrating may be greater. The claimants feel they have no real
assurance that Iran win cooperate in upholding its end of the Agreement. The claimants
have no way of predicting the length of time required to arbitrate their claim and receive
a decision. The claimants are unsure of the three foreign arbitrators' dispositions and
attitudes about the merits of the claimants' positions. See Senate BankingHearing,supra
note 1, at 92 (panel discussion).
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it intended to curtail the broad authority the President had been
exercising under the TWEA.
Moreover, neither the IEEPA nor its predecessor, the TWEA,
was ever viewed as empowering the President to remove pending
cases from the jurisdiction of federal courts. In fact, in other cases
involving frozen assets, courts have held that the freeze itself does
not prevent the courts from litigating the rights to the frozen
assets. 133 Thus, it seems that Congress did not, under the IEEPA,
intend to delegate to the President the power to remove cases from
the jurisdiction of federal courts. But it should be noted that even if
the IEEPA does not represent an express grant of authority to terminate litigation, it is nonetheless highly relevant as an indicator of
congressional support for presidential action in times of
emergency. 134
C.

THE HOSTAGE ACT

President Carter also relied on the so-called Hostage Act 135 for

authority to settle the Iranian hostage crisis. This obscure Act,
enacted in 1868, provides
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United
States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of
any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to
demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it
appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship,
the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the
release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall
use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and
proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings
soon as practicable be communicated by the Presirelative thereto shall as
136
dent to the Congress.

The Hostage Act does not explicitly grant the President the
power to nullify domestic suits or attachments against foreign governments. Nowhere are these powers discussed in the congressional
133. Zittman v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 446, 451 (1951) (by Executive Orders in 1941 the
President froze the assets of German nationals); Nat'l Airmotive Corp. v. Iran, 499 F.
Supp. 401, 404-05 (D.D.C. 1980); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 77 Civ.
1251, slip op. at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1978).
134. See 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2985 (1981).

135. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976). Congress passed the Act because "naturalized citizens
of the United States being present in Great Britain, without the commission of any
offense, had been arrested, tried, convicted, sentenced, and punished as criminals, upon
the ground that they were natural born citizens of the Crown. . . ." House COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN FOREIGN
STATES, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868), reprintedin CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. pt.

5, app. 94, 94 (1868).

136. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976).
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debates on the Act. 13 7 But these omissions are not significant. Congress was considering the Hostage Act at a time when the President,
in effect, already exercised power to forbid domestic suits against

foreign sovereigns: the executive branch, until the mid-twentieth
century, made all decisions regarding a foreign sovereign's immunity
from suit.' 38 Therefore, the congressional debates focused on other

powers the President could exercise to seek the release of Americans
held captive abroad. 139 Clearly, the drafting Congress intended the

President to enjoy a variety of powers under the Act. 140 The debates
show that Congress intended the President to have authority to com-

mit acts having effects both at home and abroad. 14 1 Indeed, one congressman stated that the President "is to do all he can under the
Constitution and laws in every way to secure the release of a citizen"

who is improperly detained.142
Judicial interpretations of the Hostage Act support the conclusion that the President possesses broad authority under that Act.
Before the Dames & Moore decision, the only important interpreta137. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 3, 2311-18; pt. 5, 4204-09, 4231-35, 435260 (1868).
138. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
139. Congress considered the power to employ diplomatic means, the power to
imprison summarily the citizens of nations that unjustly imprisoned Americans, and the
power to terminate all commercial intercourse with a foreign nation unjustly holding
American prisoners. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 5, 4233, 4355; pt. 3, 2317,
4205 (1868). The final version of the Hostage Act contains the first of these mentioned
powers: the President is to inquire into the reasons for the imprisonment, and to demand
the release of the captive Americans. The latter two powers are not mentioned in the Act
partly because Congress did not want to appear to be limiting the President's authority to
only enumerated powers. Admittedly, there was vigorous opposition to providing the
President with the power to summarily imprison foreigners. See e.g., CONG. GLOBE,
su.pra note 137, pt. 5, at 4205-06. "[To seize an innocent citizen or subject of another
country and hold him in prison on account of the improper arrest of an American citizen
would be an act of personal injustice and outrage." Id at 4234 (statement of Sen.
Morton).
140. [T]hose portions of the bill which confer the specific powers there named
upon the President should be stricken out, for the reason that they only provide
two specific ways by which the rights of American citizens abroad shall be vindicated; one is by suspending commercial intercourse with the foreign country, and
the other is by arresting a citizen of that country in the United States, when there
may be a great variety of cases arising where other and different means would be
equally effective, and where the end desired could be accomplished without
resorting to such dangerous and violent measures.
Id at 4233 (statement of Sen. Williams).
141. See Note, The Hostage-act:New Lifefor an OldLaw, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 369
(1981).
142. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 137, at 4333 (statement of Sen. Williams). This statement referred to the form of the bill that Congress eventually approved. At several
points in the debates congressmen discussed amendments that would have specifically
required the President to exercise all his powers under the Constitution. These did not
pass because they were thought to lack precision. Id at 4333, 4354. Nonetheless, the
Congress seemed to be in agreement that the President should be able to exert his full
constitutional powers.
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tions of the Hostage Act involved its use to authorize travel restrictions. The President successfully relied on the Hostage Act to refuse

to allow American citizens to travel to communist nations, 143 and to
refuse to issue passports to Communist Party members. 144 These
cases confirm the President's ability to take actions under the Hostage Act that have effects both at home and abroad. Indeed, there is
nothing to suggest that the President may not exercise his fullest con45
stitutional powers under the Hostage Act.'
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Supreme Court did not consider the Hostage Act as authority for the President's action nullify-

ing attachments of Iranian assets in this country. The Court was
satisfied that the IEEPA authorized that action. 146 The Court did,
however, examine the language and history of the Hostage Act with
reference to the President's suspension of domestic litigation against
Iran. The Court noted that the broad language of the Act suggested
it would cover this presidential action, 147 but refused to rely on the
Hostage Act as specific authorization for the interference with
domestic litigation.' 48 After studying the legislative history, the
Court concluded that Congress passed the Hostage Act to deal with a
143. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (Department of State refusal to issue passport
to Cuba upheld); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918
-(1959) (Department of State refusal to issue passports to China, Korea, and Viet Nam
upheld). Even though the President did not deny these travel permits in response to the
taking of American prisoners, the President was justified in part because his actions prevented a situation from arising that would require him to invoke his Hostage Act powers.
That is, these passport refusals seem td have anticipated the taking of hostages by the
communist nations. Zemel v. Rusk,'3$1 U.S. 1, 15 (1965); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d
905, 910 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
144. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd sub nom. Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958) (regulations prohibiting the issuance of passports to Communist
Party members upheld).
145. There is dicta in Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 918 (1959), that may indicate that the President possesses only diplomatic powers
under the Hostage Act. "The instrumentalities he must use to fulfill the congressional
mandate are diplomatic, or foreign-service consular." Id at 910. A more complete reading of the opinion, however, reveals that the President's powers may not be so limited.
A decision on the part of the President to prevent, if possible, the necessity for
calling into play his diplomatic instrumentalities andthe use ofhis powers--persuasive or compulsory-upon a foreign nation is a phase of "foreign affairs."
The selection by him of the means- to be used in a given such case rests in large
part upon policy, obviously foreign policy.
Id (emphasis added). It has been stated elsewhere that the Hostage Act requires the
President "to exert the full diplomatic andpoliticalpowerof the United States on behalf
of any citizen... injeopardy abroad." Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)
(emphasis added). Certainly, then, the Hostage Act authorizes the use of more than
merely diplomatic fnstrumentalities. See generally Note, The HostageAct: New Lifefor
an Old Law, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 369 (1981).
146. 101 S.Ct. 2972, 2984.
147. Id at 2985.
148. Id
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situation quite unlike that presented in the Iranian crisis. 149 Furthermore, the Court was not convinced that Congress contemplated the
type of actions taken in the Iranian crisis. Congress simply may
have contemplated reprisals directed against the offending nation
and its citizens. 50 Although it would not read the Hostage Act as
specific authorization for the suspension of litigation, the Court
noted that it was relevant as an indication of "congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as
those presented" by the hostage crisis.' 5 '
D.

SUMMARY

The analysis of the relevant statutes indicates that the FSIA,
passed in 1976, codified the current doctrines of sovereign immunity
and gave the judiciary the exclusive voice in determining the extent
of immunity a foreign state would enjoy in United States courts.
This Act, however, was directed primarily at routine commercial litigation and may not have diminished the President's power to conduct foreign policy and settle suits against foreign states in times of
crisis. The IEEPA, passed one year later, specifically authorized the
nullification of attachments. Although neither the IEEPA nor the
Hostage Act specifically authorized the cancellation of the claims,
each of these statutes indicates that Congress intended to endow the
President with a broad array of powers in dealing with international
crises. This congressional support is crucial to an evaluation of the
constitutionality of these actions.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUSPENSION OF
LITIGATION
The President's nullification of the attachments on Iranian
assets was constitutional. The President acted with the express
authority of the Congress; the language of the IEEPA authorized the
action. The case for the constitutionality of the Executive Order suspending the Iranian litigation pending in American courts is not so
clear. In the field of foreign affairs, the President's powers extend
beyond those that the drafters provided in the Constitution, and"
those that the Congress has expressly delegated to him.152 Accord149. Id
150. Id
151. Id
152. "Students of American government, and citizens generally, know that American
foreign relations are in the charge of the President." L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1972). "The President as Chief Executive, Commander-in-Chief
and the representative organ, seems to have sufficient power to make all political decisions in foreign affairs not exclusively vested in Congress or the treaty-making power and
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ingly, the citations of authority in the Executive Orders implementing the Hostage Agreement included not only the IEEPA and the
Hostage Act, but also "the authority vested in [the] President by the
Constitution and statutes."' 5 3 These powers are the President's
54
inherent powers over the conduct of foreign affairs.
The President's inherent powers are great, 55 but they are not
unlimited. At the least, they are subject to the limits of the Constitution. 56 Thus, although the President may assume powers that are
not conflicting with international law, treaty or existing act of Congress." Q. WRIGHT,
THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 267 (1922). See also E. CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1948, at 216-24 (1948). The landmark case
espousing the broad foreign relations power of the President is United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), wherein Justice Sutherland, interala, reiterted that, "[tihe President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its
sole representative with foreign nations." Id at 319 (quoting ANNALS OF CONG. 6th
Cong., col. 613 (1800) (statement of John Marshall)).
153. Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-85, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-32 (1981); Exec. Order No.
12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981).
154. The Constitution expressly provides that the President shall be Commander in
Chief (U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1), make treaties (id cl. 2), appoint ambassadors (id),
and faithfully execute the laws, (id § 3). Those powers not specifically enumerated are
inherent powers. E. CORWIN, supra note 126; see also L. HENKIN, supra note 152, at 1628.
155. A stranger reading the Constitution would get little inkling of such large
Presidential authority, for the powers explicitly vested in him are few and seem
modest. .. . What the Constitution says and does not say, then, can not have
determined what the President can and can not do. The structure of the federal
government, the facts of national life, the realities and exigencies of international
.relations, the practices of diplomacy, have afforded Presidents unique temptations and unique opportunities to acquire unique powers.
As a result, in addition to powers which were indisputably the President's by
explicit enumeration, many more came to him by accretion ...
L. HENKIN, supra note 152, at 37-38. See also E. CORWIN, supra note 152, at 209-10.
The source of the foreign relations powers of the federal government in general is
disputed. Justice Sutherland seemed to suggest that the foreign affairs powers of the
federal government are extra-constitutional. He stated that "the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 318 (1936). Instead, he contended that when the American colonies separated from
Great Britain, the powers of external sovereignty passed directly from the Crown to the
federal government. Id at 316. Commentators have criticized this theory. Specifically,
some have suggested that Justice Sutherland's history is inaccurate because at the birth of
the Union, the federal government did not in fact exercise external sovereignty. Levitan,
The ForeignRelations Power: An Anaolsis ofMr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE
L.J. 467 (1946). But whether his reasons are right or wrong, the vitality of Justice Sutherland's doctrine of broad federal powers over foreign affairs remains unquestioned. L.
HENKIN, supra note 152, at 23-28.

156. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 152, at 94-99. Moreover, it is clear that even
Executive settlement agreements may not violate the Constitution. "[A]n executive
agreement, not being a transaction which is even mentioned in the Constitution, cannot
impair Constitutional rights." Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 606 (Ct. Cl.
1955); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 171 (1978).

supra note 152, at 251-81.

See also L. HENKIN,
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not specifically granted to him by the Constitution, 157 he may not
usurp powers that the Constitution clearly grants to Congress. 158 In
addition, the President's foreign affairs powers are not exempt from
those constitutional limitations that favor individual rights. 159 Therefore, the inquiry into the constitutionality of the President's order
suspending the Iranian litigation must focus on two questions. First,
whether the President's actions violated the doctrine of separation of
powers because of his interference either with Congress's establishment of federal court jurisdiction or with the judiciary's exercise of
that jurisdiction. 160 Second, even if the President's actions did not
violate principles of separation. of powers, whether the interference
with the litigation constituted a taking under the fifth amendment,
thus entitling the claimants to jusf compensation.

A. SEPARATION OF POWERS
1. Frameworkfor Analysis
Over the years the courts have employed several conceptual

approaches to analyze separation of powers problems. 161 Of these,
Even a properly ratified treaty may not conflict with the Constitution. Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); L. TRIBE, supra, at 169-70. Therefore, afortiori an executive
agreement may not transgress constitutional boundaries.
157. In the field of foreign affairs, the lines distinguishing the powers of the President
from the powers of the Congress are blurred. The President and the Congress share the
power to conduct foreign affairs and courts do not require rigid delegations of power.
[The foreign relations powers appear not so much "separated" as fissured, along
jagged lines indifferent to classical categories of power: some powers and functions belong to the President, some to Congress, some to the President-and-Senate; some can be exercised by either the President or the Congress, some require
the joint authority of both ....
Delegations by Congress to the President have
been extensive and constant and Curtiss-Wright [299 U.S. 304 (1936)] tells us that
in foreign affairs the principle of Separation does not bar them.
L. HENKIN, supra note 152, at 32. Therefore, it would be unusual and unnecessary to
require that the IEEPA or the Hostage Act contain an explicit delegation of power to
assure constitutionality. These statutes are valuable as indicators of congressional
approval of the President's power to cancel suits against Iran.
158. [The President] cannot exercise, even for foreign affairs purposes, the general
powers allocated to Congress: he cannot regulate patents or copyrights or the
value of money, or establish post offices, or dispose of American territory or
property; he cannot enact necessary and proper laws to carry into execution the
powers of Congress, or even his own powers, for example, criminal laws to
enforce an arms embargo. He cannot spend money on his own authority for
foreign aid, or draw funds from the Treasury, without Congressional appropriation, to build an embassy.
L. HENKiN, supra note 152, at 95-96.
159, L. HENKIN, supra note 152, at 251-81.
160. U.S. CONST. art III.
161. There is no single, generally accepted procedure for analyzing separation of powers problems. Indeed, one commentator has made a strong argument that legalisms are
of little use in this field and that, instead, a strong appreciation of current political realities is essential to a sensible resolution of these issues. Frohnmayer, The Separation of
Powers: An Essay on the Vitality ofa ConstitutionalIdea, 52 OR. L. REv. 211,213 (1973).
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the approach Justice Jackson took in his concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 162 is most readily applicable

to foreign affairs issues.' 63 In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court
followed the general framework set out in Youngstown.

64

Justice

Jackson outlined three categories of Presidential action:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate ....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain ....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
powers minus any constitutional powers of
only upon his own constitutional
165
Congress over the matter.

2. PresidentActing With CongressionalAuthorization

In upholding the Hostage Agreement, the Supreme Court in
Dames & Moore held that the President's actions suspending the liti66
gation fit into the first category under Justice Jackson's analysis.'
As support for the President's actions, the Court relied not only on

Congress's implied grants of broad powers to deal with international
emergencies discovered in the IEEPA and the Hostage Act,' 67 but

168
also on Congress's history of acquiesence in executive settlements.

Crucial to the Court's reasoning was the fact that as a matter of

international practice, the executive branch has historically enjoyed
the power to enter into international claims settlement agreements.169 The Court did not adequately point out, however, that the

Hostage Agreement settling the Iranian crisis differs from previous
claims settlement agreements, and that Congress's position on claims

settlements generally is far from clear.
Nevertheless, a convenient summary of four conceptual approaches to separation of
powers issues appears in Nagel, SeparationofPowers andthe Scope ofFederalEquitable
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661, 686-97 (1978).

162. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). This well-known case
involved.the validity of President Truman's effort to seize and operate .the nation's steel
mills in order to avert a nationwide strike by the steelworkers. The Court held the Presidential action unconstitutional.
163. L. HENKIN, supra note 152, at 104-08.
164. 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2977 (1981).
165. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
166.
167.
168.
169.

101 S. Ct. 2972, 2990 (1981).
Id
Id at 2987-88.
Id
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Claims Settlement Practice

Today, there are three methods by which a United States
national may assert a claim against a foreign government. 170 First,
the national may institute suit in an American court.' 71 The FSIA
currently provides the only means of access to a federal court for a
suit against a foreign sovereign. 172 Second, the national may insti-

tute proceedings in the courts of the foreign sovereign. 173 The American national, however, is then subject to the laws of the foreign

sovereign. Third, if these procedures fail, the national may ask the
United States government to espouse his claim. 174 In this last situation, where the national has no other recourse for his claim, the Pres175
ident exercises his broadest powers to dispose of the private claim.
In practice, the American government has employed three methods

of settling claims of its nationals:
(1) by submitting individual claims through the diplomatic channel to the

foreign government concerned and obtaining restitution or compensation; (2)
by obtaining a lump sum in settlement of all claims, with the amount paid
distributed by an agency of the United States government; or (3) by an agreement submitting
all claims to an international arbitral tribunal for
1 76
adjudication.

Although the first method is the traditional method of
espousal, 17 7 it was not employed in reaching the Hostage Agreement.
Rather, the Hostage Agreement contains elements of each of the lat-

ter two methods of espousal. For claims of $250,000 or less, the
78
United States government hopes to reach a lump-sum settlement;1
170. Note, The Nature and Extent of Executive Power to Espouse the International
Claims of UnitedStates Nationals, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 95, 96 (1973). See generally R. LILLICH & G. CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION
AND PRESENTATION (1962).
171. See 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L., supra note 170, at 96 n.5.
172. See supra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
173. See 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L., supra note 170, at 96 n.5.
174. R. LILLICH & G. CHRISTENSON, supra note 170, at 3-4, 88-103.
175. In this situation, the claim belongs not to the private claimant, but to the Ameri-

can government. Accordingly, the government exercises full control over the claim. It
alone decides whether to pursue the claim in international courts, to reach a compromise
settlement, or to drop the claim altogether. In addition, if the government collects an
award or settlement, it is under no obligation to pass the money on to the national.
Nonetheless, the American government normally passes awards on to the interested individuals, but these payments are considered gratuities. Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439, 457
(1896); L. HENKIN, supra note 152, at 262; R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY Lump SUM AGREEMENTS, PART I: THE COMMENTARY
1 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 211-214 (1965); 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1216-33 (1967).
176. Department of State Memorandum, "Nationalization, Intervention or Other
Taking of Property of American Nationals," March 1, 1961 reprintedin 56 AM. J. INT'L

L. 166 (1962).
177. R. LILLICH & G.

CHRISTENSON, supra note 170, at 89. For more discussion of
this method of espousal, see id at 88-103.

178. See supra note 40.
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all claims over $250,000 must be presented to an international
17 9

tribunal.
The government has frequently used the second method-the

lump-sum settlement national claims commission technique-especially as a means of compensating individuals for losses sustained in
Eastern Europe during and after World War HI.180 The general procedure for compensating individual claimants under this technique
begins with the President. The President reaches an Executive
agreement with a foreign nation. The President agrees to extinguish
all claims of a certain category that U.S. nationals brought against
the foreign sovereign in exchange for the foreign government's
lump-sum payment to the United States. Private claimants then
present their claims to a congressionally established national claims
commission that has the exclusive authority to disburse the fund.""'
Determinations of the commission are binding and nonreviewable. 8 2 These agreements, therefore, are the product of presidential
and congressional cooperation.

Since World War II, the United States has only infrequently
resorted to the third method of claims settlement-the submission of

the claims to an international arbitral tribunal. 183 Like many arbitration arrangements, the Hostage Agreement provides for a tripartite international arbitral tribunal composed of representatives from
the United States, Iran, and a neutral state. 184 The affected claims

are barred from domestic courts, and the international commission's
85
decisions are binding and nonreviewable.1

Because the President participates in the claims settlement process, commentators generally accept the assertion that he enjoys
179. See supra notes 37-48.
180. R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL

COMMISSIONS 8 (1962). See generally R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note 175;
Coerper, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission andJudicialReview, 50 Am. J. INT'L
L. 868 (1956).
181. R. LILLICH, supra note 180, at 8-23; Re, InternationalLaw andtheForeign Claims
Settlement Commission, 23 FED. BAR. J. 79 (1963).
182. Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470 (1941); Nebenzal v. Re,
407 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); First Nat'l City Bank of
New York v. Gilliland, 257 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958); Zutich
v. Gillilland, 254 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1958); Am. & European Agencies, Inc. v. Gillilland,
247 F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 884 (1957); Haas v. Humphrey, 246 F.2d
682 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 854 (1957); Dayton v. Gillilland, 242 F.2d 227
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 813 (1957); De Vegvar v. Gillilland, 228 F.2d 640 (D.C.
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 994 (1956). See also R. LILLICH, supra note 180, at 13.
183. See e.g., R: LILLICH & G. CHRISTENSON, supra note 170, at 115; Note, The Gut
Dam Claims Agreement with Canada, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1965).
184. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
185. See Doerchuck v. Mellon, 55 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1931); American-Mexican
Claims Bureau, Inc. v. Morganthau, 26 F. Supp. 904 (D.D.C. 1939).
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blanket authority to settle claims of American nationals. 8 6 For
instance, the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law states:
The President may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state based on the
an injury to a United States national,
responsibility of the foreign state for 187
without the consent of such national.

The two most important claims settlement cases are United
8 9 These cases arose
States v. Belmont'8 8 and United States v. Pink.1

out of the Litvinov Assignment, by which the Soviet Government
assigned its claims against American nationals to the United States
in exchange for diplomatic recognition.190 The cases involved the
rights of foreigners to funds in deposit accounts in New York banks.

The Soviet Government claimed ownership of the accounts and
assigned the claim to the United States. 19 1 Against defenses that the
Soviet nationalizations did not affect the New York assets because
the act of nationalization violated New York public policy, 192 Belmont and Pink held that in light of the foreign effects of the cases,

federal law, as expressed in the executive agreement implementing
the assignment, must override state public policy. 193 The Court also
held that the nationalization and confiscation of the deposit account

did not effect a taking of property in violation of the fifth amendment because the Constitution could not operate extraterritorially to
regulate a foreign government's handling of the property of its own
186. "International agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against the
government or nationals of another are established international practice reflecting traditional international theory." L. HENKIN, supra note 152, at 262. See also 2 C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 890-91 (2d rev. ed. 1945); 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 175, at
1217; Q. WRIGHT, supra note 152, at 244. The cases that are most widely cited for this
proposition are United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) and United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942). But see the discussion of Belmont andPink, infra notes 188-200 and
accompanying text.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 213 (1965).
188. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
189. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
190. The purpose [of the Litvinov Assignment] was to bring about a final settlement of the claims and counterclaims between the Soviet Government and the
United States; and it was agreed that the Soviet Government would take no steps
to enforce claims against American nationals; but all such claims were released
and assigned to the United States, with the understanding that the Soviet Government was to be duly notified of all amounts realized by the United States
from such release and assignment.
United States v. Belmont 301 U.S. 324, 326 (1937); DEP'T OF STATE, ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNION OF SovIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (1948).
(Department of State Publication 528). See generally D. BISHOP, THE ROOSEVELT-LITvINOV AGREEMENTS (1965).
191. 315 U.S. at 210-11; 301 U.S. at 326.
192. 315 U.S. at 214; 301 U.S. at 327.
193. 315 U.S. at 217-26; 301 U.S. at 327-32.
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nationals.194 Those aggrieved nationals could only look to their own

government for redress.
One can find in Pink broad language on the extent of presidential power to conduct foreign affairs. 195 In particular, there is language indicating that the President may do whatever is necessary in
recognizing a foreign government, and that he may settle claims of
United States nationals. 196 Although commentators have criticized
Belmont and Pink,197 later courts have cited the decisions on several

occasions in support of the proposition that the President may settle
the claims of American citizens against foreign governments.' 98 Most
recently, in Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court relied, in part, on
Pink in upholding the validity of the Hostage Agreement. 99

Cautioning against strong reliance on Belmont and Pink, it must
be noted that the claims settlements involved in these early cases are
distinguishable from the claims settlement mechanism provided for
in the Hostage Agreement. Belmont and Pink involved litigation of
interests in nationalized property. The major issue there was
whether state public policy could override the foreign affairs powers
of the federal government.2°° Belmont and Pink did not involve
suits against a foreign sovereign, and the Court's holdings in those

cases did not impair the ability of federal courts to hear cases.
It is clear that the Court in Belmont and Pink did not have occa-

sion to address the central issue in the Hostage Agreement litigation:
194. 315 U.S. at 226-34; 301 U.S. at 332. Pink also indicates that the agreement's
purpose of providing American citizens with a claim superior to that of foreigners was a
factor in its holding that there was no fifth amendment violation. 315 U.S. at 228.
195. "The purpose of the discussions leading to the policy of recognition was to
Settlement of all Amerresolve 'all questions outstanding' between the two nations ....
ican claims against Russia was one method of removing some of the prior objections to
recognition based on the Soviet policy of nationalization." United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 227 (1942).
[The authority to recognize foreign governments] is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized. It includes the power to determine the
policy which is to govern the question of recognition. Objections to the underlying policy as well as objections to recognition are to be addressed to the political
department and not to the courts.
Id at 229.
196. "Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our
nationals... certainly is a modest implied power of the President who is the 'sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations.'" Id at 229 (quoting
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 229 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
197. Note, United States v. Pink-A Reappraisal,48 COLUM. L. REV. 890 (1948); Note,
Effect of So iet Recognition Upon Russian ConfiscatoryDecrees, 51 YALE L.J. 848 (1942);
55 HARv. L. REv. 864 (1942).
198. Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 n.10 (2d Cir. 1951); Avaramova v.
United States, 354 F. Supp. 420, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Statement of Interest,
supra note 48, at 7, 10, 16.
199. 101 S. Ct. at 2988.
200. 315 U.S. at 217-26; 301 U.S. at 327-32.
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whether the President's power to settle claims entails the power to
restrict federal court jurisdiction. For this reason, Belmont and Pink
are not strong authorities to support the President's ability to enter
into the Hostage Agreement.
The Hostage Agreement differs significantly from earlier claims
settlement agreements. One may distinguish the Hostage Agreement
from all pre-1952 settlement claims and corresponding court cases
and argue that the outcomes of those claims and cases, including
Pink, should have no bearing on the questions of executive authority
presented in the Hostage Agreement litigation. The distinction rests
on the fact that before 1952 the absolute theory of sovereign immunity prevailed, placing in the Executive sole responsibility for determining when and under what conditions a foreign government could
be sued.201 Since 1952, however, the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity has governed; the executive authority in this area is therefore dramatically reduced. 20 2 Cases from the pre-1952 period, suggesting broad executive authority, should not govern the outcome of
the difficult issues presented in the Hostage Agreement litigation.
In Dames & Moore, the petitioning claimant made this argument to the Court. The Court acknowledged that there was some
merit to the argument, but was quick to point out that even after
setting aside all pre-1952 claims settlements, there still remained ten
post-1952 claims settlements by executive agreement. 20 3 The congressional acquiescence in these ten settlements was strong evidence
of the Executive's authority to act as he did in concluding the Iranian
hostage crisis.
One might continue to argue that the Hostage Agreement is
even distinguishable from these post-1952 claims settlements. The
results of pre-1976 claims settlements should not determine the outcome in the present case, for in 1976 the Congress passed the FSIA,
finally ousting the executive branch from any role in deciding when
foreign sovereigns may be subject to suit in U.S. courts.2°4 The fact
that the Executive had a visible and legitimate role to play in pre1976 claims settlements does not mean he may act similarly today.
Yet there are flaws in this argument as well. Even conceding
that pre-1976 claims settlements are distinguishable, there have been
three claims settlements by executive agreement since 1976.205 Fur201. See supra note 91.
202. Id
203. 101 S. Ct. at 2989.
204. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
205. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Settlement of Claims,
May 11, 1979, United States-People's Republic of China, 30 U.S.T. 1957, T.I.A.S. No.
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thermore, one year after passing the FSIA in 1976, Congress passed
the IEEPA.206 In the legislative history of that Act, the drafters indicated that nothing in the Act was to impair the President's ability to
settle claims. 207 Finally, the Congress that passed the FSIA considered but soon discarded other proposals that, if passed, would have
20
restricted the President's ability to settle claims.
Nevertheless, one can still try to distinguish the Hostage Agreement. It clearly differs from even the post-1976 claims settlements in
that none of those settlements included a provision allowing the
President to terminate domestic litigation. 20 9 The Hostage Agreement is the only claims settlement agreement that has removed cases
from federal courts. Although, in the past, the President has enjoyed
much discretion in settling international claims, in the Hostage
Agreement, the President has done something that no American
President has done in the history of international claims settlement.
9306; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Peru, September 22, 1976, United States-Peru, 27 U.S.T. 3993, T.I.A.S. No.
8417; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning Claims of Nationals of the United
States, May 1, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 4214, T.I.A.S. No. 8446.
206. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. 111978).
207. S. REP. No. 466, supra note 105, at 6.
208. See 101 S. Ct. at 2990 n.11.
209. The United States-China settlement called for China to make a lump-sum payment of $80.5 million in settlement of any claims of U.S. or Chinese nationals "arising
from any nationalization, expropriation, intervention, and other taking of, or special
measures directed against, property of nationals of the USA on or after October 1, 1949
and prior to the date of this Agreement. . . ." 30 U.S.T. 1957, 1958. There was no
mention of a cancellation of suits against China. Indeed, there probably were no suits
pending in American courts because Chinese assets were blocked, U.S.T. 1957, 1958-59,
and most or all claims arose before Congress passed the FSIA in 1976.
The United States-Peru settlement called for Peru to pay over $61 million to an American firm, the Marcona Mining Company, because the Government of Peru had expropriated the assets of that company. 27 U.S.T. 3993, Art. I. The Peruvian government
further agreed not to impose or enforce against the company any liability, claim, or civil
action, that arose out of the company's activities in Peru prior to the expropriation. 27
U.S.T. 3993, Art. III. Both countries agreed not to allow any of its nationals to submit
claims to the government of the other party that relate to the nationalization or the operation of the Marcona Mining Company. 27 U.S.T. 3993, Art. IV. But the agreement did
not remove any suits from United States courts.
According to the United States-Egypt agreement, Egypt was to make a lump-sum payment of $10 million "in full settlement and discharge of all the claims of nationals of the
United States against the Egyptian Government which are described in this Agreement."
27 U.S.T. 4214, Art. I. The Agreement states that the U.S. nationals' claims affected
included, but were not limited to, claims regarding land reform, sequestration, nationalization, expropriation for public utilities, financial and fiscal matters. 27 U.S.T. 4214, Art.
IL But the Agreement does not purport to entirely extinguish all claims of U.S. nationals. Although the U.S. agreed not to espouse any claims affected by the Agreement, the
Agreement recognizes that U.S. nationals may assert their claims in the courts of third
countries. 27 U.S.T. 4214, Art. VI. In addition the agreement explicitly excludes certain
claims from the Agreement. 27 U.S.T. 4214, Agreed Minute. These exclusions included
official claims of the Government of the United States, and certain private claims of U.S.
nationals. Id
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b. Congressional Authorization
The Dames & Moore Court identified three indicators of Con-

gress's implicit authorization for executive claims settlement. By far
the most important indicator is Congress's establishment of commissions to disburse lump-sum settlements.210 Congress created the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 21 ' as a general decisionmaking body with respect to the claims of U.S. nationals for settlement funds, and has also acted to facilitate the President's settlement

of claims against particular nations. 212 Moreover, Congress has
never objected to this historical practice of Presidential claims settlement.213 But because the Hostage Agreement is far different from
any of the previous claims settlement agreements, these congressional acts do not constitute express authorization for the President's
implementation of the Agreement. These congressional acts are,
however, indicators of general congressional acquiescence in execu-

tive claims settlements.
The Dames & Moore Court also relied on the IEEPA and the
Hostage Act as indicators of congressional authorization. 21 4 These

acts further evidence Congress's approval of broad executive powers
to deal with international crises. 215 Finally, Congress's recent
actions indicate its support for the Hostage Agreement. After the
Agreement went into effect, committees of the House and Senate

held hearings to review the terms and implications of the Hostage
Agreement. 216 The tone of the hearings was favorable and supportive of the position the government had taken. Though it had the
opportunity, neither house of Congress passed any sort of resolution

or legislation expressing displeasure with the terms of the Agreement. 21 7 The transcripts of the hearings provide further evidence
210. International Claims Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1644m (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). The commission is now known as the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.
Id See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2987 (1981).
211. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1644m (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
212. The Supreme Court pointed out that Congress authorized the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission to adjudicate the merits of claims of U.S. nationals against East
Germany and has made an effort to establish an official inventory of losses of private
U.S. property in Vietnam. 101 S. Ct. at 2987-88. Each of these measures is designed to
assist the Executive branch in its conduct of &ovemment-to-government negotiations of
these claims. Id
213. See e.g., id at 2987.
214. Id at 2985.
215. Id at 2985-86. See also supra notes 103-51 and accompanying text.
216. See Senafe Banking Hearing,supra note 1; Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,
supra note 1; House Foreign Affairs Hearings,supra note 2.
217. The Dames & Moore Court contrasted the position the Congress took while
reviewing the Hostage Agreement with positions other Congresses have taken in
response to the President's claims settlement activity. In the past, the Congress has
shown itself capable of soundly disapproving of Executive action: in 1973 Congress
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that Congress has generally acquiesced to the President's role in
claims settlement matters.
In summary, the Congress has expressly approved of similar,
but not identical, settlements. Congress has granted the President
broad powers through the IEEPA and the Hostage Act, and congressional committees have subsequently approved of the Hostage
Agreement. This is strong, but not conclusive, evidence that the
President was acting in harmony with the will of Congress when he
implemented the Hostage Agreement.
3. President'sActions are Incompatible with the Will of Congress

In Dames & Moore, the petitioner's argument that the President's actions were inconsistent with the will of Congress centered on
the FSIA. Exercising its constitutionally granted authority to establish federal court jurisdiction,218 the Congress passed the FSIA in
order to ensure judicial, nonpolitical determinations of the circumstances under which a foreign sovereign should be immune from suit
in U.S. courts. 219 The FSIA recognizes exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity and requires the federal courts to apply these standards. 22o Notably absent from the FSIA is a provision allowing the
President to ignore or overturn a judicial decision denying immunity. In fact, the legislative history of the FSIA reveals that Congress
intended that subsequent executive agreements would not discard its
provisions lightly.22 1 Moreover, neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage
quickly passed legislation requiring that the 1973 Executive Agreement with Czechoslovakia be renegotiated. 101 S. Ct. at 2991 n.13.
218. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I. See also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871);
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441
(1850); Hart, The Powerof Congressto Limit the JurisdictionofFederalCourts:An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. Rnv. 1362 (1953).
219. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
220. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607 (1976).
221. The immunity provisions of the FSIA
are made subject to "existing" treaties and other international agreements to
which the United States is a party. In the event an international agreement
expressly conflicts with this bill, the international agreement would control.
Thus, the bill would not alter the rights or duties of the United States under the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement or similar agreements with other countries;
nor would it alter the provisions of commercial contracts or agreements to which
the United States is a party, calling for exclusive nonjudicial remedies through
arbitration or other procedures for the settlement of disputes.
H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 91, at 17; S. REP. No. 1310, supra note 91, at 17. But the
preeminence of international agreements clearly applies only to agreements existing at
the time of passage of the FSIA.
mhe committee has preserved the reference to "existing international agreements" but has deleted the language that would make this bill subject to "future"
agreements. Mention of future agreements was found to be unnecessary and
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Act explicitly grants the President the kind of authority that would
allow him to override judicial determinations under the FSIA.
Therefore, the Hostage Agreement represents presidential action that
(1) is inconsistent with at least one expression of the will of Congress-the FSIA, and (2) attempts to usurp a function that the Constitution grants to Congress.

In Dames & Moore the Supreme Court had two responses to
this argument. First, it held that the Hostage Agreement was not
unconstitutional because the Agreement did not, as the petitioner
argued, divest the federal courts of "jurisdiction." The Court decided
that the Agreement merely changed the substantive law governing

the lawsuit.222 It is difficult to accept this conclusion. The only substantive rule that would have the same effect as the Hostage Agree-

ment is the one that provides that federal courts cannot decide
claims against Iran unless the Arbitral Tribunal refuses to entertain
the suit. The effect of such a rule is indisputable. The federal court
is no longer able to decide cases that, but for the Hostage Agreement,

were comfortably within its jurisdiction. Therefore, regardless of its
characterization, the President has impaired the power of the judici223
ary to entertain a certain class of suits.
The Court also responded to Dames & Moore's argument by
refusing to read the FSIA as broadly as Dames & Moore suggested. 224 The Court explained that Congress intended the FSIA

only to remove the sovereign immunity barrier to suit. According to
the Court, Congress could not have meant to interfere with the Presi225
dent's power to settle claims.

misleading. The purpose for including the reference was to take into account the
possibility that sovereign immunity might become the subject of an international
convention. Such a convention would, under article VI of the Constitution, take
precedence, whether or not the bill was made expressly subject to a future international agreement. Moreover, it was thought best to eliminate any possible
question that this language might be construed to authorize a future international agreement.
S. REP. No. 1310, supra note 91, at 6.
222. 101 S. Ct. at 2989. The Court emphasized the fact that President Reagan merely
"suspended" the claims against Iran. They will "revive" if the Arbitral Tribunal refuses
to hear the claim. The Court accurately interprets the Agreement, however, the fact
remains that the Agreement effected a change of forum for those claims over which the
Arbitral Tribunal exercises jurisdiction. A change of forum is different from a change of
substantive law.
223. There are good grounds for arguing that the Hostage Agreement does, in fact,
restrict federal court jurisdiction. The FSIA provides inpersonamjurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. See von Mehren, supra note 91, at 46-48. In effect, the FSIA is a federal
long-arm statute. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 91, 13-14. One may argue that since
the FSIA would have allowed federal courts to hear the Iranian litigation, the President's
frustration of FSIA policy effected a restriction of federal court jurisdiction.
224. 101 S. Ct. at 2989-90.
225. Id
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4. Conclusion
The separation of powers analysis shows that strong arguments
exist to support both the proposition that the Hostage Agreement is
consistent with the will of Congress, and the proposition that the
Agreement conflicts with the will of Congress. Therefore, it is easy
to conclude that congressional pronouncements on this issue are
ambiguous. Because of the "absence of either a Congressional grant
or denial of authority," 226 the Supreme Court erred in Dames &
Moore by fitting the President's actions into Justice Jackson's first
category of presidential actions, rather than placing them into the
more appropriate second category. 227 Within the second category,
according to Justice Jackson, the President can continue to act in
reliance only on his own authority, 'lut the distribution of power
228
between the President and the Congress in this area is less certain.
Even if the Dames & Moore Court correctly characterized the
President's actions as being within the "zone of twilight, '229 of the
second category, the Court would have been reluctant to invalidate
the President's actions. Although the Congress did not clearly
authorize the President's actions, neither did it clearly disapprove of
them. Recategorizing the President's actions would not have permitted the Court to be less sensitive to the delicate foreign affairs ramifi,cations that invalidation of the Agreement would have triggered.
Such an invalidation would have handicapped the President's ability
to effectively deal with futurp international crises. Thus, the Court's
conclusion that the President's actions were constitutional is appropriate, but it should have been reached in the second category of
Justice Jackson's framework.
B.
L

THE TAKING OF PROPERTY UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

The ProceduralSelling

Although the separation of powers analysis suggests that the
President's suspension of the suits against Iran was valid under the
circumstances, 230 some claimants may later assert that their property
was taken without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment. 23 ' Because the lawsuits have been only "suspended" and not
terminated, 232 the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore held that the
226. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
227. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
228. Id at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
229. Id at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
230. See supra notes 161-229 and accompanying text.
231. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
232. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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taking issue was not ripe for review.233 President Reagan's Executive Order implementing the Hostage Agreement indicates that the
government will move to dismiss the pending claims from the district
courts only after the Arbitral Tribunal has rendered a decision on
the merits. 234 Only after the government moves to dismiss will the
taking issue be ripe for review.235 The Supreme Court made it clear
of Claims236 may exercise
that at the appropriate time, the Court
237
jurisdiction over any takings claim.
2. The Substantive Law
The fifth amendment warns that "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation." 238 Unfortunately,
there is no generally accepted procedure for analyzing compensable
233. 101 S. Ct. at 2991. Both circuit courts that addressed this issue agreed with the
Supreme Court. Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 448
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d
800, 814 (Ist Cir. 1981). Two district courts had earlier ruled that both.the termination of
the claims and the dissolution of the attachments were compensable takings. Marschalk
Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Elec. Data Sys.
Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of the Gov't of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350, 1364 (N.D. Tex.
1981).
234. Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 4, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981); 31 C.F.R. § 535.222
(1981).
235. Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 448 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 815
(1st Cir. 1981).
236. 101 S.Ct. at 2992. The opinion of the First Circuit in Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (1st Cir. 1981) seems to indicate that claimants
will be permitted to assert their takings claims in the district courts rather than in the
Court of Claims. Id at 448. A careful reading of the Tucker Act, however, reveals that
the district courts have the jurisdiction to hear only those claims against the United
States not exceeding $10,000 in amount. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976); see also Chas. T.
Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 815 (Ist Cir. 1981); 14
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3657 (1976). It is
doubtful that many of the claims against Iran will involve an amount small enough to
qualify the claimant to proceed in the district court.
237. 101 S.Ct. at 2992. See also Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water &
Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 815 (Ist Cir. 1981).
Much of the uncertainty regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was due to
the treaty exception to the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976) provides: "Except as
otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the Court of Claims shall not have jurisdiction of
any claim against the United States growing out of or dependent upon any treaty entered
into with foreign nations." The courts have held this section applicable to international
executive agreements as well as treaties. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d
889 (Ct. Cl.1976); Yassin v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 509 (Ct. Cl. 1948). In order for a
claim to "grow out of' or be "dependent upon" a treaty, "the right itsel, ... the foundation of the claim, must have its origin-derive its life and existence-from some treaty
stipulation." United States v. Weld, 127 U.S. 51, 57 (1888). In this case, although a suit
against the government for compensation would certainly be related to the agreement,
the claim itself is grounded in the Constitution. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States, 534 F.2d 889, 902-06 (Ct. C1. 1976); S.N.T. Fratelli Gondrand v. United States,
166 Ct. Cl.473, 478 (1964).
238. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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takings. 239 Both the courts 240 and the commentators 24 1 have com-

plained about the confusion in this area. The cases discussing the
taking of Iranian claims indicate that future litigation of the taking
issue will focus on three questions:242 (1) Were either the pre-judgment attachments or the pending claims "private property"? (2) If
these were private property interests, was this property "taken"? (3)

before the Arbitral TribuIf property was taken, do the proceedings
243
nal offer "just compensation"?
a. Have the Claimants Acquired "Property Interests"?
The federal courts that addressed the taking issue in the Iranian
assets litigation suggest that there may be two property interests that

the provisions of the Hostage Agreement confiscated: (1) the attach239. Prof. Michelman lists the four most popular approaches to takings problems as:
(1) the physical invasion theory; (2) the diminution of value theory; (3) the balancing
approach, and (4) the private fault and public benefit theory (more widely known as the
"noxious use" theory). Michelman, Propery, Utility, andFairness."Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof "Just Compensation"Law,80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1184-1201 (1967).
See also Sax, Takings and the PolicePower, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 46-60 (1964) (criticizing
each of the approaches listed above except the balancing approach).
240. The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty.... [T]his
Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government ....

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978). See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ("There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins."); United States v. Cent. Eureaka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (whether a restriction constitutes a taking depends 'upon
the particular circumstances of each case"); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149,
156 (1952) ("No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from
noncompeasable losses. Each case must be judged on its own facts.")
241. "Few legal problems have proved as resistant to analytical efforts as that posed
by the Constitution's requirement that private property not be taken for public use without payment ofjust compensation." Sax, Takings,PrivatePropertyandPublicRights, 81
YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971). "[T]he predominant characteristic of this area of the law is a
welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results." Sax, supra note 239, at 37. See
also Michelman, supra note 239, at 1183-1201; Note, Reexamining the Supreme Court's
View of the Taking Clause, 58 TEX. L. Rav. 1447 (1980).
242. In addition to the three issues identified in the text, there is a fourth issue that is
pertinent to the analysis. To be compensable, the taking must be for a "public purpose."
If the purpose of the taking is not sufficiently "public," it may be voided entirely. L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 458 (1978). Because the Hostage Agreement
was made, in part, to stabilize American foreign policy, it will be difficult for the government to deny that the Agreement was for a public purpose.
243. It should be emphasized that this inquiry is concerned only with whether or not
the claimants should receive compensation. The traditional remedy for a fifth amendment taking is the invalidation of the ordinance or statute authorizing the confiscation of
property. Note, supra note 241, at 1471. The Supreme Court has now held that the

Hostage Agreement is valid. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S.Ct. 2972 (1981). Thus,
even if the claims have been taken, the Agreement will not be invalidated.
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ments and (2) the underlying claims. 244 The Supreme Court ruled in

Dames & Moore that the attachments of Iranian assets did not give
rise to a property interest warranting just compensation under the

fifth amendment. 245 The Court reasoned that because the Treasury
Department licenses authorizing the attachments were "'revocable,'
'contingent,' and 'in every sense subordinate to the President's power
under the IEEPA,'"246 the President could nullify the attachments
24 7
without compensating the claimants.
244. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 n.6, 2991 (1981); Am. Int'l
Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chas. T. Main
Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth. 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981); Marschalk
Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
245. 101 S. Ct. at 2984 n.6. The tw6 circuit courts that addressed this issue reached the
same conclusion. Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 448
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d
800, 808 (1st Cir. 1981). The only district court to address the issue reached the opposite
conclusion. Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'1 Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 98 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
The analysis these courts followed regarding the taking of attachments applies only to
the attachments that were obtained after President Carter froze Iranian assets on November 14, 1979. In at least one case, however, an American claimant obtained a pre-judgment attachment of Iranian assets before the freeze. Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial
Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979).
In Behring, Chief Judge Fisher held that although the Iran-United States Treaty of
Amity is not an express waiver of attachment immunity for the purposes of FSIA
§ 16 10(d), a reasonable reading of that Treaty indicates that it was intended to allow prejudgment attachments and that FSIA § 1609 preserves that intention. Id at 394-95. See
supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. Judge Duffy of the Southern District of New
York reached the opposite conclusion. Reading & Bates Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co.,
478 F. Supp. 724,728 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But if Judge Fisher properly applied the FSIA in
granting the pre-judgment attachment, a strong argument may be made that Behring
International, Inc. obtained a property interest in the attachment and that it must be
compensated for the loss of that interest.
The Supreme Court has in the past demanded compensation for the destruction of
similarly inchoate interests. In Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), the govemnment took title to certain manufacturing materials that were subject to a materialmen's lien. Because the plaintiff's lien was rendered unenforceable, the Court held that
the government had taken the plaintiffs interest in the liens, and that the government
had to provide just compensation. Id at 46-49. Similarly, in Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), the Court held that a mortgagee suffered a compensable taking when an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act substantially impaired his
right to foreclose on the mortgage. Id at 601.
246. 101 S.Ct. at 2984 n.6.
247. In Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
Judge Duffy held that the attachments were not fully subordinate to the President's
power. He advanced two arguments. First, he set out to distinguish those cases in which
courts held that the revocation of government licenses is not a compensable taking. Specifically, he cited Acton v. United States, 401 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 945 (1969) (revocable license to prospect for and develop uranium ore reserves);
Isthmian Airways, Inc. v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 598 (1941) (revocable license to
occupy certain land and erect hangers and shops to be used in operating an airline);
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973) (revocation of license to permit grazing of
livestock on federal lands). According to Judge Duffy, in each of these cases the revocation of the license merely prevented the claimant from conducting an activity, it did not
require him to return property that he had obtained through the license. Therefore,
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The analysis of the taking of the claims themselves is more complex. Although the Supreme Court has never held that an executive
settlement of private claims constitutes a compensable taking, 248 the
Court in Dames & Moore implied that in this case the executive settlement may constitute such a taking.249 Thus, the Court seems to
Judge Duffy argued that the revocation of the attachment licenses could only prevent
future attachments, it did not allow the President to nullify current attachments without
compensating the claimant. 518 F. Supp. at 99-100. This argument ignores the unambiguous terms of the licenses. The regulations allowing the licenses clearly state that any
attachments obtained thereunder might be revoked at any time. The President did not
limit his authority to preventing future attachments. The President obviously reserved to
himself the power to nullify the attachments at anytime. Therefore, the Supreme Court
was correct in holding that no property interest grew out of the attachments.
Second, Judge Duffy argued that because claimants expended large sums of money in
attorneys' fees and in obtaining the bond required by the New York attachment law, they
had a reasonable expectation that their attachments would not be nullified. "To argue
otherwise means that the government was using the rights and fortunes of individual
citizens to create merely another bargaining chip to use in international negotiations."
518 F. Supp. at 100. This argument is weak for two reasons. First, because the regulations authorizing attachments clearly warned that the attachments were revocable at any
time, it is unreasonable for the claimants to expect that they had acquired nonrevocable
rights by attaching Iranian property. Second, the attachment licenses were never
intended as bargaining chips in the hostage release negotiations. The government did
not need the attachments to strengthen its negotiation position with Iran. The Freeze
regulations prevented the transfer of assets to Iran whether or not the assets had been
attached. Therefore, the attachments were probably allowed only to rank the rights to
Iranian property in case the President later lifted the Freeze.
248. L. HENKJN, supra note 152, at 263.
249. By ensuring that the Court of Claims has the jurisdiction to hear ripe takings
claims, the Supreme Court has suggested that some claimants may successfully prove
their takings claims. 101 S. Ct. at 2991-92. The First Circuit and the D.C. Circuit agree
with this view. Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 448
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d
800, 815 (Ist Cir. 1981). In Chas. T Main, the First Circuit explained that
There may well be situations when the President's extinction or "settlement"
of a claim against a foreign government, without the consent of the claimant,
would constitute a "taking" of private property for a public "use." See U.S.
Const., Amend V. Here, of course, the President has not simply "extinguished"
Main's claim, but has provided alternative means for its resolution and satisfaction. Thus, his actions could at very most constitute a "taking" of property only
if the alternative method of satisfying the claim (ie., submission to the Tribunal)
is demonstrably and measurably inferior to the rights otherwise available to
Main (Ze., the right to attempt to obtain an unsecured judgment in the federal
court).

651 F.2d at 814-15.
In Marschalk, Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), Judge
-Duffy held that the Hostage Agreement has already effected a taking of the claims.
"When the right to enforce a contract in the United States courts is taken away or materially lessened, the contract and the rights thereunder are taken within the meaning of the
Constitution." Id at 93. This court has interpreted the Hostage Agreement as taking not
only the claim, but the contract as well. But it is not clear that the contract was, in fact,
taken. The Hostage Agreement did not purport to affect the rightf growing out of the
contract. It merely changed the forum in which the contract is to be litigated. Therefore,
it seems more appropriate to treat the Hostage Agreement as taking only the right to sue
in federal court.
In addition, the cases that discuss the compensability of contract rights are somewhat
conflicting. The Marschalk court cited two cases for this proposition. The court first
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have rejected the government's contention that the claims are the
250
sole property of the government.

Several cases suggest that legal claims are property protected by

the fifth amendment. 251 Gray v. UnitedStates252 is the most persuasive of these cases. Gray arose out of the "French Spoilation
commented on Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), where the Supreme Court
held that the government's amendment of a life insurance policy constituted a fifth
amendment taking. "The Fifth Amendment commands that property be not taken without making just compensation. Valid contracts are property. . . ." 292 U.S. at 579.
The second case, United States v. N. Pac. Ry., 256 U.S. 51 (1921), did not involve fifth
amendment issues. But the passage the Marschalk court cited makes it clear that the
U.S. government must uphold its contracts. Id at 64-67.
There are, however, several cases in which governmental interference with private contracts has been upheld. Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (prohibition of "gold clauses" was constitutional); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219
U.S. 467 (1911) (prohibition of lifetime free railroad passes was constitutional); Battaglia
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948) (Portal-toPortal Act, which effectively amended labor contracts, was constitutional). Therefore, if
the taking of the contract was the only issue, the outcome would be uncertain.
The other case that held that the Hostage Agreement effected a taking had already
proceeded to judgment. In that case it was the judgment, not the claim, which had been
taken. Elec. Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of the Gov't of Iran, 508 F. Supp.
1350 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
250. Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
See Statement of Interest of the Justice Department, supra note 48, at-14.
251. Significantly, the Second Circuit has noted that congressional removals of jurisdiction may constitute takings under the fifth amendment:
[The exercise by Congress of its control over jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say,
while Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts. . . it must not so exercise that power as. . . to take private
property without just compensation.
Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887
(1948). Afortiori presidential removals of jurisdiction are also subject to fifth amendment requirements.
Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. CL 1955) presents a more closely
analagous case. In Seery the government had alleged that an executive agreement with
Austria, which purported to relieve the United States of responsibility for damage to
Austrian property, prevented Seery, an American citizen owning property in Austria,
from suing the government to recover compensation for the damage to her property. In
effect, the executive agreement would have prevented Seery from exercising her right to
sue in the Court of Claims. Holding that an executive agreement may not impair constitutional rights, the court rejected the government's argument. The court explained that
'[i]t would be indeed incongruous if the Executive Department alone, without even the
limited participation by Congress which is present when a treaty is ratified, could not
only nullify the Act of Congress consenting to suit on Constitutional claims, but, by
nullifying that Act of Congress, destroy the Constitutional right of a citizen." Id at 607.
See also Note, supra note 170; Comment, Executive Agreements and Emanationsfrom the
Fith Amendment, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 362 (1955).
But see R. LILLICH & G. CHRISTENSON, supra note 170, at 95 which suggests that the
President may settle claims of United States nationals against foreign governments without effecting a taking under the fifth amendment.
252. 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886). See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 152, at 263-65.
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Claims." 2 3 Treaties of 1778 bound America and France in reciprocal obligations, 25 4 but the French revolutionary government later
claimed that America violated the treaty.255 In addition, between
1791-1800 France authorized the seizure on the high seas of neutral
American vessels with neutral cargo.2 56 These seizures constituted
violations not only of the treaties of 1778, but of customary international law as well. 25 7 An executive agreement in 1800 resolved the
dispute. According to the agreement, France agreed not to press its
claims of American treaty violations while the United States agreed
not to pursue the claims of its citizens who had been harmed by the
French seizures. 25 8 In effect, then, the United States settled the

claims of its nationals by abandoning those claims in exchange for
France's agreement to overlook American treaty violations.
The court never questioned the President's authority to sacrifice

private claims in such a manner.259 The court noted, however, that
the United States government had decided to espouse the private

claims long before it reached the Agreement with France. 260 There-

fore, the court reasoned that when the government trades "individual" claims (such as those that the government was committed to

espouse) for "national" purposes (such as the release from treaty
obligations), a taking under the fifth amendment occurs, and the
26
harmed individuals are entitled to just compensation. '
253. The French Spoilation Claims is the name coined to refer to the claims of Americans whose vessels were seized by the French during the French Revolution. See L.
HENKIN, supra note 152, at 263-65.
254. 21 Ct. Cl. at 350-51.
255. Id at 352-60.
256. Id at 365-66.
257. Id at 366.
258. Id at 392-93.
259. Id
260. Id
261. [I]n the negotiation of 1800 we used "individual" claims against "national"
claims, and the set-off was of French national claims against American individual claims. That any Government has the right to do this ... is too clear for
discussion. Nevertheless, the citizen whose property is thus sacrificed for the
safety and welfare of his country has his claim against that country; he has a
right to compensation, which exists even if no remedy in the courts or elsewhere
be given him....
It seems to us that this "bargain". .. by which the present peace and quiet of
the United States, as well as their future prosperity and greatness were largely
secured, and which was brought about by the sacrifice of the interests of individual citizens, falls within the intent and meaning of the Constitution, which prohibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
We do not say that for all purposes these claims were "property" in the ordinarily accepted and in the legal sense of the word; but they were rights which had
value, a value inchoate....

1d
It should be noted that Gray was merely an advisory opinion. At the time, the
Supreme Court often requested advisory opinions of the Court of Claims. These opin-
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In addition, although the Restatement (Second) of Foreign

Relations Law recognizes the President's ability to settle suits of
American citizens against foreign governments,

262

the drafters of the

Restatement were clearly sensitive to the rights of the individual
claimants. Accordingly, the Reporter's note suggests that such settlement agreements might be considered takings under the fifth

amendment.

263

This discussion indicates that under appropriate circumstances,

private claims, even if not yet filed, may be considered property
interests protected by the fifth amendment. Therefore, the claimants

whose pending suits against Iran may be terminated can make a
strong argument for fifth amendment protection.
b.

Has the Property Been "Taken"?
There is a great deal of confusion surrounding the taking

requirement of the fifth amendment. Besides Justice Holmes' vague
admonition that regulation will be considered a taking when it "goes
too far," 264 the courts have offered little guidance on this issue. The

Supreme Court has consistently decided taking claims on the basis of

"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. 2 65 Accordingly, the taking
claims of Americans who sued Iran will be decided more by reference to the circumstances of the Hostage Agreement and the various

cases than by reference to legal doctrines.
There is widespread agreement that while the claims remain

suspended, the government has not effected a taking.2 66 Yet even
after the district court dismisses a claim from its docket, the govern-

ment and the claimant may disagree on whether the claim has been
taken. The claimant will point out that he had a right to avail himions were not binding. See Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 1386, 1395 (Ct.
Cl. 1970) (Nichols, J., concurring) (distinguishing and criticizing Gray).
262. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 213 (1965).
263. The question whether the United States must pay a national of the United
States for waiving, or settling for less than full vlaue, his claim for injury by a
foreign state may arise in situations where the government may determine that
other factors, such as political considerations, affecting the relations of the
United States with the foreign state, call for a settlement less favorable to the
United States than it would seek if it were concerned only with the economic
considerations arising out of the claim and similar claims of other United States
nationals.
Id reporter's note.
264. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
265. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
266. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2991 (1981); Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v.
Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 815 (1st Cir. 1981).
Only the Marschalk court disagrees. Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518
F. Supp. 69, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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self of the domestic forum, that he properly instituted suit, and that
his right to progress with the suit was taken. This, according to the
claimant, clearly constitutes a taking.267 On the other hand, the government will argue that the President had the unfettered right to settle the claim, 268 but that, in any event, the Arbitral Tribunal was in
fact a more favorable forum for the claimant than the district
court.269 Therefore, according to the government, the claimant's
right to have his claim litigated-his legal cause of action-has not
has merely provided for an
been taken; the Hostage Agreement
270
alternative forum for his suit.
The government's argument seems misdirected. Although the
Hostage Agreement has not impaired the claimant's legal cause of
action, before the Hostage Agreement was signed the claimant also
had a right to a suit in a United States district court. Surely the right
to sue in the district court is worth something. After the district
court dismisses the case, this right will have been taken. If the Hostage Agreement has provided for a more favorable alternative
forum, this does not indicate that the right to the suit in the United
States court was not taken, but merely suggests that the government
has provided "just compensation" for the taking.
c. Have the Claimants Received "Just Compensation"?
The preceding sections indicate (1) that the claims against Iran
are protected property interests, and (2) that after the suits against
Iran are dismissed from the federal courts pursuant to the Hostage
Agreement, these claims will have been taken. Therefore, the critical
question is whether the Hostage Agreement has provided just com271
pensation for this taking.
There are three possible methods that a court may employ in
analyzing the just compensation issue. First, the court may attempt
to determine the amount of damages the claimant would have recovered if he was able to sue in the federal court. If this amount exceeds
the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal, the government would
be required to make up the difference. This is perhaps the fairest of
the three possibilities. It recognizes that the right to sue in federal
court is valuable because it may result in a greater award for the
267. See eg., Brief of Plaintiff Electronic Data Systems Corp., supra note 48, at 40.
268. See e.g., Statement of Interest of the Justice Department, supra note 48, at 10-21.
269. See infra note 273.
270. See Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800,
814 (Ist Cir. 1981).
271. Because this inquiry asks only whether the claimants have received just compensation, while the traditional remedy for a prohibited taking is invalidation of the taking,
the courts offer no guidance on the issue. See supra note 243.
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plaintiff. Unfortunately, there is an enormous disadvantage to this
process. The only way to precisely determine what a claimant would
have recovered in a federal court is by requiring a full relitigation of
the case. The time, expense, and the inconvenience of full relitigation are too high a price to pay for the fairness that this option offers.
Second, the court may acknowledge that at the time the suits
against Iran were interrupted, their value was uncertain. The value
of the claims depended on: (1) whether the suit was properly before
the federal court under the FSIA; (2) the merit of the claimant's legal
theories and his ability to prove his factual contentions; (3) the merit
of the defendants' theories and their ability to prove their contentions; and (4) many other uncertainties. Taking these uncertainties
into account, the court may attempt to determine the dollar value of
the claim at the time it was taken, 272 and compare this amount to the
award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal. If the award of the Arbitral Tribunal is less than the dollar value of the claim at the time the
suit was interrupted by the Hostage Agreement, the government
would make up the difference. This method more accurately reflects
the value of what was taken than the first method, and it does not
require full relitigation. However, it also poses a serious practical
problem. Specifically, under this method the court will be faced with
the difficulty of attaching a dollar value to an inchoate, extremely
speculative interest. The results may turn out to be arbitrary, and
the courts may be tempted to ask for extensive arguments or offers of
proof on the various uncertainties before they assess the valuations.
Therefore, this method is no more desirable than the first.
Third, the court may compare the Arbitral Tribunal to the
United States district court and attempt to determine whether the
Arbitral Tribunal was an adequate substitute for the domestic
forum. The claimants and the government have already argued at
length over whether the Arbitral Tribunal or a district court is the
more desirable forum for these claims. 273 It is too soon, however, to
272. The value contemplated here is the amount that a claimant would have recovered
if he had sold his claim. But it would be difficult to determine the fairest date for valuation. Because of the difficulties in the negotiation of the settlement, the value of the
claims at the time of the Agreement, and indeed throughout the hostage crisis, was
extremely uncertain.
273. The government has argued that American claimants have a better chance of
prevailing on their claims before the Arbitral Tribunal than they would have had before
the United States courts. In support of this, the government pointed out that under the
Agreement, Iran agreed to replenish the claims settlement account to assure full payment
on all awards of the Arbitral Tribunal. Declaration, supra note 1, Points II and III, para.
7. In addition, the Agreement states that any awards granted by the Arbitral Tribunal
may be enforced in the courts of any nation. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note
1, Art. IV. For these reasons, the American claimants may, indeed, be better off in the
Arbitral Tribunal. See Chas. T. Main Int'l, Ins. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 615
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conclude this debate. Only after the Arbitral Tribunal has rendered
decisions will it be possible to evaluate its work. 274 Yet, in light of

the difficulties the first two methods of evaluating "just compensation" present, this may be the most attractive alternative. Under this
approach, the Court of Claims would evaluate the workings of the
Arbitral Tribunal on a case by case basis. If the claimant has had a
reasonable opportunity to present his claim, and the arbitrators do
not seem to have been overtly prejudiced against the claimant, the
court should hold that the claimant has been justly compensated
regardless of the amount of the award he receives. But, if it appears
that the Arbitral Tribunal has not rendered substantial justice, the
court should hold that the claimant has not received just compensa-

tion. In these cases, the parties will have to relitigate the case before
the Court of Claims in order for the court to determine the value of

the claim.
CONCLUSION

By attempting to terminate federal litigation, the Hostage
Agreement represents an attempt to do something that has never
been done in the course of international claims settlement. The

Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan upheld the Hostage
Agreement, but this Note suggests that its decision should have

rested on other grounds. Although the IEEPA may be considered
specific statutory authority for the President's nullification of the prejudgment attachments, this Note suggests that the President's action
interrupting the suits already in federal courts was neither expressly
authorized nor expressly prohibited by the relevant statutes. There-

fore, the President was acting within the middle category of Justice
F.2d 800, 815 (1st Cir. 1981); Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 815 F. Supp. 69,
93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Yet there are also indications that the claimants have not gained anything through the
Agreement. For instance, because the FSIA did not entitle Iran to sovereign immunity
for the claims that were terminated, the waiver of sovereign immunity is not a major
concession. In addition, it will be much more expensive for litigants to pursue their
claims abroad before the Arbitral Tribunal, an "overtly political tribunal," instead of
availing themselves of the procedures of a nearby federal court. Finally, given the continuing instability of the Iranian government, there is no guarantee that Iran will uphold
the Hostage Agreement by replenishing the settlement account. American claimants
may then recover no more than thirty cents on the dollar from the settlement account.
See Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 1, at 75 (prepared statement of Lawrence W. Newman, attorney from Baker & McKenzie); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v.
Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 615 F.2d 800, 815 (1st Cir. 1981); Marschalk Co. v.
Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 815 F. Supp. 69, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
274. At last report the arbitrators, staff members, and representatives from the United
States and Iran were still trying to resolve knotty procedural and administrative matters.
The arbitration process itself is due to begin in the fall of 1982. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,
1982, at All, col. 1.
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Jackson's framework in which the distribution of powers between
Congress and the President is uncertain. But even if the Court had
agreed that the President's actions fell within this category-rather
than in the category characterized by express congressional authorization-it should have upheld the Hostage Agreement.
Dames & Moore v. Regan is not the last chapter in the litigation
involving the Hostage Agreement. Claimants who are unhappy with
the outcome of their cases before the Arbitral Tribunal are certain to
seek compensation in the Court of Claims. This Note suggests how
the Court of Claims is likely to deal with certain taking issues. It
indicates that, more than anything else, the Court of Claims will be
required to make a series of enormously difficult factual
determinations.
ChristopherMassaroni

